Konfiguration som kode med Terraform og OpenTofu
Du kan holde din fremforge-organisation i kode med HashiCorp Terraform eller OpenTofu. Begge CLI’er kører den samme konfiguration med to open source-providers fra de offentlige registries:
- Forgejo-objekter (repositorier, branch-beskyttelse, teams, Actions-secrets og -variabler) gennem Forgejos eget REST API med
svalabs/forgejo. - fremforge-indstillinger (godkendelsespolitik, IP-tilladelsesliste, standarder for branch-beskyttelse, scanningspolitik og scannerindstillinger, uforanderlige releases, SIEM-videresendelse, webhooks med mere) gennem fremforge-API’et med den generiske REST-provider
magodo/restful.
Til fremforges egne indstillinger findes der nu en dedikeret provider: fremforge-provideren (source = "frem.sh/fremforge/fremforge", 0.1.1, installeret fra frem.sh med signaturkontrol) dækker dem med typede ressourcer, import efter organisationens slug og drift på hvert argument, du sætter. Brug den hellere til nye konfigurationer. Modulet på denne side forbliver dokumenteret, mens du flytter; Flyt fra modulet viser hvordan. Repositorier og branch-beskyttelse bliver under alle omstændigheder hos svalabs/forgejo.
Providers
| Provider | Version | Licens | Taler med |
|---|---|---|---|
svalabs/forgejo | 1.6.1 | MPL-2.0 | Forgejo, https://frem.sh/api/v1 |
magodo/restful | 0.25.2 | MPL-2.0 | fremforge, https://frem.sh/_app/api/v1 |
Provider-blokkene er ens for begge CLI’er:
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.11.0"
required_providers {
restful = {
source = "magodo/restful"
version = "0.25.2"
}
forgejo = {
source = "svalabs/forgejo"
version = "1.6.1"
}
}
}
provider "restful" {
base_url = "https://frem.sh/_app/api/v1"
# 60 writes a minute per token; retry the 429 instead of failing half-way.
client = {
retry = {
status_codes = [429]
count = 6
wait_in_sec = 10
max_wait_in_sec = 60
}
}
security = {
http = {
token = {
token = var.fremforge_token # ffp_... fremforge API token
}
}
}
}
provider "forgejo" {
host = "https://frem.sh"
api_token = var.forgejo_token # Forgejo access token
}Hastighedsgrænse. fremforge-API’et tillader ét token 60 skrivninger i minuttet og svarer 429 med Retry-After derover. Det fulde eksempel er omkring 27 skrivninger at anvende og 28 at nedlægge, så to kørsler lige efter hinanden går over grænsen. Blokken client.retry får provideren til at vente og prøve en 429 igen, hvilket er sikkert, fordi en 429 betyder, at skrivningen ikke blev udført.
>= 1.11.0 er nødvendig for write-only-argumenter, som holder de secrets, du sender (en Actions-secrets værdi, en SIEM-godkendelsesheader), ude af state. Terraform 1.11 og OpenTofu 1.11 understøtter dem begge.
Hvor binærfilerne kommer fra. source = "magodo/restful" peger på registry.terraform.io under Terraform og på registry.opentofu.org under OpenTofu. Begge registries henter downloaden fra projektets GitHub-releases. Commit .terraform.lock.hcl: den registrerer hver providers checksummer, så en senere init afviser en binærfil, der har ændret sig. Lock-filen registrerer registry-værtsnavnet, så hav én pr. CLI, og del ikke en arbejdsmappe mellem dem.
Signaturerne er forskellige i de to CLI’er. Terraform kontrollerer hver providers udviklersignatur ved init og skriver Installed magodo/restful v0.25.2 (self-signed, key ID 2A3C3526EE99038E) og Installed svalabs/forgejo v1.6.1 (self-signed, key ID B50B0D17F7964C79). OpenTofu-registryet har ingen signeringsnøgler til disse to providers, så OpenTofu skriver Signature validation was skipped og stoler alene på checksummerne. Under OpenTofu er den committede lock-fil derfor den eneste kontrol af, at binærfilen er den, du har gennemgået.
Hvis du ikke vil have CI til at hente fra GitHub ved hver kørsel, så spejl providerne én gang, og installér fra spejlet:
terraform providers mirror -platform=linux_amd64 ./providers # or: tofu providers mirror ...# ~/.terraformrc, ~/.tofurc, or the file named by TF_CLI_CONFIG_FILE
provider_installation {
filesystem_mirror {
path = "/path/to/providers"
include = ["*/svalabs/forgejo", "*/magodo/restful"]
}
}Tokens
De to providers bruger forskellige tokens, fordi de taler med forskellige API’er.
fremforge-API’et (restful). Et ffp_...-token. Opret et organisations-API-token under Administration → API-tokens (frem.sh/<org>/_admin/api-tokens). Det er bundet til én organisation, overlever, at den person, der oprettede det, forlader den, og udløber efter højst 90 dage. Opret et skrivebeskyttet token til plan, og gem skrive-scopes til det job, der kører apply:
| Indstillinger | Læs (plan) | Skriv (apply) |
|---|---|---|
| Godkendelsespolitik, IP-tilladelsesliste, operatøradgang, e-maildomæner, SSH CA, standarder for branch-beskyttelse, scanningspolitik, Actions-politik, opbevaring af artefakter, SLA-politik, politik for image-signaturer, SIEM-endpoints | policy:read | policy:write |
| Scannerindstillinger, fejltilstand for push-beskyttelse, uforanderlige releases | findings:read | policy:write |
| Webhook-destinationer | webhooks:read | webhooks:write |
| Deployment-miljøer | environments:read | environments:write |
| Organisationens Actions-secrets | orgs:read | orgs:write |
| Afhængighedsopdateringer | renovate:read | renovate:write |
| SSO-domæner | sso:read | sso:write |
Fra et Forgejo Actions-job kan du undgå at gemme et token ved at bytte jobbets OIDC-token til et ffp_-token, der gælder i en time (se OIDC token exchange). I dag giver den udveksling et fast sæt scopes (orgs:read, runners:read, findings:read, findings:write, sboms:write): nok til at planlægge scanner-, push-beskyttelses- og uforanderlighedsindstillingerne, men ikke til at ændre dem og ikke til at planlægge policy:*-indstillingerne. Enhver ændring af en sikkerhedsindstilling kræver policy:write, som runner-udvekslingen aldrig giver, så et repositorys CI kan ikke slå din organisations kontroller fra. Brug et organisations-API-token til apply.
Forgejo-API’et (forgejo). Et Forgejo-adgangstoken, ikke et ffp_-token. Provideren kontrollerer tokenet mod Forgejo, når den starter, også når den ikke har noget at administrere, så det kan ikke stå tomt. Vil du kun administrere fremforge-indstillinger, så slet forgejo.tf, provider-blokken forgejo, dens post i required_providers og variablen forgejo_token. Hvis din organisations godkendelsespolitik ikke tillader brugertokens, så opret det under Brugerindstillinger → Git-PAT’er (frem.sh/user/settings#ff-git-pats), som tilbyder scopes til repositorier og issues: nok til repositorier og branch-beskyttelse, men ikke til teams.
Modulet
Modulet administrerer alle de politikindstillinger på organisationsniveau, som fremforge-API’et udstiller. Hver indstilling er et valgfrit input: udelader du det, rører modulet den ikke. For hver indstilling, du sætter, ejer modulet præcis de felter, du nævner. Felter, du udelader, bliver hverken sendt eller sammenlignet, så en ændring af dem i konsollen vises ikke som drift.
Det ligger i docs-repositoriet under examples/terraform/. Filerne nedenfor er indlæst direkte derfra, så denne side altid viser den kode, vi tester.
Modulets inputs: variables.tf
# Every setting is optional. Leave a variable at null and the module does not
# touch that setting at all. Set it to an object and the module owns exactly the
# fields you name: fields you leave out are neither sent nor compared, so the
# console can still change them without showing up as drift.
#
# Field names are the API's own. The OpenAPI spec is at
# https://docs.frem.sh/api/openapi.yaml.
variable "org" {
description = "The fremforge organisation slug, as in frem.sh/<org>."
type = string
}
variable "reset_on_destroy" {
description = <<-EOT
What `destroy` does to a singleton setting (one that always exists and has
no DELETE). false (the default): destroy writes the current values back, so
the live setting is left exactly as it is and only state forgets it. true:
destroy writes the platform default for every field you manage. Use true for
a throwaway test org, never for an org people work in.
EOT
type = bool
default = false
}
# --- Authentication and access ---------------------------------------------
variable "auth_policy" {
description = "PATCH /orgs/{org}/auth-policy. E.g. { max_pat_lifetime_days = 30, ssh_disabled = true, allow_user_pats = false }."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "ip_allowlist" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/security/ip-policy. Send all three fields: { cidrs = [...], audit_only = true, allow_platform_runners = true }. The PUT replaces the list."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "operator_access" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/security/operator-access. { allow = false } stops fremforge operators managing users in your org."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "email_domain_allowlist_enforced" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/email-domains/policy. true: members may only add email addresses on the domains in email_domains."
type = bool
default = null
}
variable "email_domains" {
description = "POST/DELETE /orgs/{org}/email-domains. Domain patterns members may use, e.g. [\"acme.com\"]."
type = set(string)
default = []
}
variable "ssh_ca" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/ssh-ca. { ca_keys = [...], require_cert = false }. (principal_policy was removed 2026-10-14: ignored by the API and no longer returned, so leave it out or plan shows a permanent diff.)"
type = any
default = null
}
variable "sso_domains" {
description = "POST/DELETE /orgs/{org}/sso/domains. Registers domains for SSO. Verification (DNS or HTTP) is a separate, manual step."
type = set(string)
default = []
}
# --- Repository and Actions defaults ----------------------------------------
variable "branch_protection_defaults" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/policy, body under branch_protection. E.g. { enabled = true, required_approvals = 1, require_status_checks = true }."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "actions_policy" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/security/actions-policy. { only_protected_branches = true } lets Actions run only on protected branches."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "artifact_retention" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/artifact-retention. { days = 30 } (1 to 90)."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "dependency_updates" {
description = "Version updates: PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/version-updates/settings. E.g. { automerge_patch = true, major_approval = true }. Every field except `schedule` and `merge_window`. `security_automerge` is no longer taken here: use security_fixes.merge."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "security_fixes" {
description = "Security fixes: PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/security-fixes/settings. E.g. { mode = \"auto_important\", merge = \"review\" }. Fields: mode, include_unknown, merge, max_open_per_repo, max_per_day, soak_days (`repos` is not managed by this module)."
type = any
default = null
}
# --- Code security ----------------------------------------------------------
variable "scan_policy" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/policy, body under scan_policy. Org-wide mode per scanner, e.g. { sast = { mode = \"enforce\", block_severity = \"high\" } }."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "scanner_settings" {
description = <<-EOT
PUT /orgs/{org}/code-security/<scanner>/settings, keyed by scanner:
sast, deps, images, secrets, licenses. E.g.
{ sast = { enabled = true, block_severity = "error" }, licenses = { enabled = true } }.
licenses also takes the licence policy: allowlisted_license_ids,
denied_license_ids, warned_license_ids, unknown_action, multiple_mode.
EOT
type = any
default = {}
}
variable "licence_repo_overrides" {
description = <<-EOT
PUT /orgs/{org}/repos/<repo>/code-security/licenses/settings, keyed by
repository name: a per-repository licence policy override. Fields:
allowlisted_license_ids, denied_license_ids, warned_license_ids (lists of
SPDX ids), unknown_action (threshold|allow|warn|deny), multiple_mode
(all|any). An omitted field inherits the org's value. E.g.
{ legacy-tool = { denied_license_ids = ["GPL-3.0-only"], unknown_action = "deny" } }.
EOT
type = any
default = {}
}
variable "push_protection_failure_mode" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/push-protection/failure-mode. \"block\" or \"allow\": what a push does when the secret scanner cannot run."
type = string
default = null
}
variable "exception_settings" {
description = <<-EOT
PUT /orgs/{org}/exceptions/settings. Fields: max_days (1..366, the longest
an exception may run), approver_team (a team of the org, or null for the
owners plus the package-policy approver list), dismissals_require_approval
(true: a finding dismissal by a non-approver waits for an approver other
than the requester, and the finding stays open until then; default false).
E.g. { max_days = 90, dismissals_require_approval = true }.
EOT
type = any
default = null
}
variable "immutability" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/code-security/immutability. WARNING: releases = true is one-way for every release published while it is on."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "dependency_proxy" {
description = <<-EOT
PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-proxy. Fields: enabled, block_until_scanned,
retention_days (7..365), metadata_filter ("off" | "shadow" | "on": hide the
versions the package policy would refuse from the package metadata the proxy
serves; "on" is refused with 403 outside fremforge's internal organisations
for now). E.g. { enabled = true, metadata_filter = "shadow" }.
EOT
type = any
default = null
}
variable "image_signature_policy" {
description = <<-EOT
PUT /orgs/{org}/image-signature-policy: which container image signatures
the org trusts at pull. { enabled = true, mode = "shadow",
identities = [{ issuer = "https://frem.sh/_app/runner/oidc",
subject_regex = "https://frem\\.sh/acme/[^/]+/\\.forgejo/workflows/release\\.yaml@refs/tags/v.+" }],
keys = [{ name = "release", public_key_pem = file("cosign.pub") }], scope = ["api"] }.
Fields left out take their defaults.
EOT
type = any
default = null
}
variable "sla_policy" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/security/sla-policy. { critical_sla_days = 7, high_sla_days = 30, medium_sla_days = 90, low_sla_days = null }."
type = any
default = null
}
# --- Integrations -----------------------------------------------------------
variable "webhooks" {
description = <<-EOT
POST/PATCH/DELETE /orgs/{org}/webhooks/destinations, keyed by name:
{ audit = { target_url = "https://hooks.acme.com/fremforge", events = ["push"], repo_filter_regex = null, active = true } }.
Only `active` can change in place; any other change replaces the destination
and mints a new signing secret.
EOT
type = any
default = {}
}
variable "siem_endpoints" {
description = <<-EOT
POST/PATCH/DELETE /orgs/{org}/siem/endpoints, keyed by name:
{ splunk = { url = "https://siem.acme.com/hec", action_prefixes = ["auth."], enabled = true } }.
Only `enabled` can change in place; any other change replaces the endpoint
and mints a new HMAC secret.
EOT
type = any
default = {}
}
variable "siem_auth_headers" {
description = "Optional auth header per SIEM endpoint name, { splunk = { name = \"Authorization\", value = \"Splunk ...\" } }. Sent once, never stored in state."
type = map(object({ name = string, value = string }))
default = {}
sensitive = true
}
variable "environments" {
description = "POST/DELETE /orgs/{org}/environments. Deployment environment names, e.g. [\"staging\", \"production\"]."
type = set(string)
default = []
}
variable "org_secrets" {
description = "PUT/DELETE /orgs/{org}/secrets/{name}. Actions secrets for every repo in the org, { NAME = \"value\" }. Values are write-only: never read back and never in state."
type = map(string)
default = {}
sensitive = true
}
# --- Package access ---------------------------------------------------------
variable "package_access_default" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/packages/access-settings: \"legacy\" (organisation-wide package access, the default) or \"granular\" (every package of a supported type is on per-package access unless it says otherwise)."
type = string
default = null
}
variable "packages" {
description = <<-EOT
Per-package access, keyed by "<type>/<name>" (the first "/" separates the
type; a name may contain more): { "container/team/app" = { mode = "granular",
inherit_repo = true, teams = { release-managers = "admin" }, actions = { api = "write" } } }.
mode: "granular", "legacy" or null (follow the organisation). teams: read,
write or admin per team name. actions: read or write per repository name,
for that repository's Actions jobs. Removing a package from the map
removes its configuration and grants.
EOT
type = map(object({
mode = optional(string)
inherit_repo = optional(bool, true)
teams = optional(map(string), {})
actions = optional(map(string), {})
}))
default = {}
}
variable "package_protection_rules" {
description = <<-EOT
Protected package names, keyed by any label: { releases = { type = "*",
name_pattern = "release/*", push = { owners = false, robots = true,
teams = ["release-managers"], actions = ["api"] }, delete = { owners = true } } }.
Only the listed principals may publish to, or delete, matching packages.
EOT
type = any
default = {}
}Modulets ressourcer: main.tf
locals {
org = "/orgs/${var.org}"
# Platform defaults, written back on destroy when reset_on_destroy = true.
# Only the fields the caller manages are reset.
defaults = {
auth_policy = {
require_hardware_backed_keys = false
max_pat_lifetime_days = 90
audit_full_payload_retention_days = 365
require_signed_commits = false
require_oidc_signed_commits = false
allowed_oidc_issuers = []
allow_user_pats = false
allow_repo_deploy_keys = false
allowed_user_pat_scopes = []
ssh_disabled = true
}
ip_allowlist = { cidrs = [], audit_only = false, allow_platform_runners = true }
operator_access = { allow = true }
actions_policy = { only_protected_branches = false }
artifact_retention = { days = 90 }
sla_policy = { critical_sla_days = null, high_sla_days = null, medium_sla_days = null, low_sla_days = null }
ssh_ca = { ca_keys = [], require_cert = false }
dependency_proxy = { enabled = false, block_until_scanned = false, retention_days = 90, metadata_filter = "off" }
immutability = { releases = false, allow_repo_opt_out = false, oci_mode = "off", oci_mutable_tags = [] }
image_signature_policy = { enabled = false, mode = "shadow", issuers = [], identities = [], keys = [], scope = [], trust_public_sigstore = false }
push_protection_failure_mode = "block"
exception_settings = { max_days = 366, approver_team = null, dismissals_require_approval = false }
# GET .../code-security/<scanner>/settings on an org that never saved them.
scanner_settings = {
sast = { enabled = true, block_severity = "error", custom_rules_url = null }
deps = { enabled = true, block_severity = "critical" }
images = { enabled = true, block_action = "warn" }
secrets = { enabled = true }
licenses = {
enabled = true
block_severity = "restricted"
allowlisted_license_ids = []
denied_license_ids = []
warned_license_ids = []
unknown_action = "threshold"
multiple_mode = "all"
}
}
# Version updates (hosted Renovate). Since 2026-10-15 a new settings row
# defaults to 2 / 5 for the PR limits, as the runner always applied.
dependency_updates = {
enabled = true
automerge_patch = true
automerge_minor = false
major_approval = true
pr_hourly_limit = 2
pr_concurrent_limit = 5
}
# Security fixes (Dependency updates, the other lane).
security_fixes = {
mode = "on_click"
include_unknown = false
merge = "review"
max_open_per_repo = 3
max_per_day = 20
soak_days = 3
}
}
# What destroy writes for a singleton: the platform default for each managed
# field, or the managed fields unchanged (a no-op write that leaves the live
# value alone).
reset = {
for k, v in {
auth_policy = var.auth_policy
ip_allowlist = var.ip_allowlist
operator_access = var.operator_access
actions_policy = var.actions_policy
artifact_retention = var.artifact_retention
sla_policy = var.sla_policy
ssh_ca = var.ssh_ca
immutability = var.immutability
dependency_updates = var.dependency_updates
security_fixes = var.security_fixes
# PUT replaces the whole policy, so the reset writes every field.
image_signature_policy = var.image_signature_policy == null ? null : merge(local.defaults.image_signature_policy, var.image_signature_policy)
dependency_proxy = var.dependency_proxy
exception_settings = var.exception_settings
} :
k => v == null ? null : (
var.reset_on_destroy ? { for f in keys(v) : f => local.defaults[k][f] } : v
)
}
}
# ============================================================================
# Singletons: every org has exactly one of each, it always exists, and there is
# no DELETE. "Create" is the same write as "update"; "destroy" is a write too
# (see reset_on_destroy). To bring an existing org under management without a
# write, import first: see docs.frem.sh/admin/configuration-as-code/#bring-an-existing-org-under-management.
# ============================================================================
# --- Authentication policy --------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "auth_policy" {
count = var.auth_policy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/auth-policy"
create_method = "PATCH"
update_method = "PATCH"
delete_method = "PATCH"
merge_patch_disabled = true
body = var.auth_policy
delete_body = local.reset.auth_policy
}
# --- IP allowlist -----------------------------------------------------------
# PUT replaces the whole list; it is read back from GET /orgs/{org}/security.
# An enforcing list that does not contain the caller's own address is refused
# (400 invalid-allowlist), so tofu/terraform cannot lock out the machine it
# runs on. Roll out with audit_only = true first.
resource "restful_resource" "ip_allowlist" {
count = var.ip_allowlist == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/security/ip-policy"
read_path = "${local.org}/security"
read_selector = "ip_allowlist"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/security/ip-policy"
delete_method = "PUT"
delete_path = "${local.org}/security/ip-policy"
body = var.ip_allowlist
delete_body = local.reset.ip_allowlist
}
# --- Operator access --------------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "operator_access" {
count = var.operator_access == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/security/operator-access"
read_path = "${local.org}/security"
read_response_template = "{\"allow\": $(body.allow_operator_user_management)}"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/security/operator-access"
delete_method = "PUT"
delete_path = "${local.org}/security/operator-access"
body = var.operator_access
delete_body = local.reset.operator_access
}
# --- Email-domain allowlist (on/off) ----------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "email_domain_policy" {
count = var.email_domain_allowlist_enforced == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/email-domains/policy"
read_path = "${local.org}/email-domains"
read_response_template = "{\"enabled\": $(body.allowlist_enforced)}"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/email-domains/policy"
delete_method = "PUT"
delete_path = "${local.org}/email-domains/policy"
body = { enabled = var.email_domain_allowlist_enforced }
delete_body = { enabled = var.reset_on_destroy ? true : var.email_domain_allowlist_enforced }
}
# --- SSH certificate authority ----------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "ssh_ca" {
count = var.ssh_ca == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/ssh-ca"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.ssh_ca
delete_body = local.reset.ssh_ca
}
# --- Branch-protection defaults ---------------------------------------------
# Applied to every new repository, and by an hourly sweep to any repository
# with no rule at all. Destroy with reset_on_destroy = true restores the
# fremforge baseline (POST /orgs/{org}/branch-defaults/reset).
resource "restful_resource" "branch_protection_defaults" {
count = var.branch_protection_defaults == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/policy"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = var.reset_on_destroy ? "POST" : "PUT"
delete_path = var.reset_on_destroy ? "${local.org}/branch-defaults/reset" : "${local.org}/policy"
body = { branch_protection = var.branch_protection_defaults }
delete_body = var.reset_on_destroy ? {} : { branch_protection = var.branch_protection_defaults }
}
# --- Org-wide scan policy ---------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "scan_policy" {
count = var.scan_policy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/policy"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = { scan_policy = var.scan_policy }
# There is no DELETE for a scanner's org-wide row. Reset writes the plan
# default (enforce, with the scanner's default severity) for each scanner you
# manage; the row stays, so GET still lists those scanners.
delete_body = { scan_policy = var.reset_on_destroy ? { for k, v in var.scan_policy : k => { mode = "enforce", block_severity = null } } : var.scan_policy }
}
# --- Actions policy ---------------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "actions_policy" {
count = var.actions_policy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/security/actions-policy"
read_path = "${local.org}/security"
read_response_template = "{\"only_protected_branches\": $(body.actions_only_protected_branches)}"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/security/actions-policy"
delete_method = "PUT"
delete_path = "${local.org}/security/actions-policy"
body = var.actions_policy
delete_body = local.reset.actions_policy
}
# --- Actions artifact retention ---------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "artifact_retention" {
count = var.artifact_retention == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/artifact-retention"
read_response_template = "{\"days\": $(body.retention_days)}"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.artifact_retention
delete_body = local.reset.artifact_retention
}
# --- Dependency updates: Version updates -------------------------------------
# GET/PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/version-updates/settings: snake_case
# both ways, the read wrapped in `settings`. `schedule` and `merge_window` are
# not managed here: both are null by default, and the provider's response
# template cannot render a null. (Until 2026-10-15 this wrote
# /dependency-updates/settings, which now answers with Deprecation headers and
# still takes security_automerge; that setting is `merge` under security_fixes.)
resource "restful_resource" "dependency_updates" {
count = var.dependency_updates == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/dependency-updates/version-updates/settings"
read_response_template = <<-EOT
{
"enabled": $(body.settings.enabled),
"automerge_patch": $(body.settings.automerge_patch),
"automerge_minor": $(body.settings.automerge_minor),
"major_approval": $(body.settings.major_approval),
"pr_hourly_limit": $(body.settings.pr_hourly_limit),
"pr_concurrent_limit": $(body.settings.pr_concurrent_limit)
}
EOT
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.dependency_updates
delete_body = local.reset.dependency_updates
}
# --- Dependency updates: Security fixes --------------------------------------
# GET/PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/security-fixes/settings. `repos` is not
# managed here (the response template renders scalars only); set it in the
# console or with the fremforge provider's fremforge_dependency_updates. The lane
# switch (who opens security PRs) is an owner decision and is not managed.
resource "restful_resource" "security_fixes" {
count = var.security_fixes == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/dependency-updates/security-fixes/settings"
read_response_template = <<-EOT
{
"mode": "$(body.settings.mode)",
"include_unknown": $(body.settings.include_unknown),
"merge": "$(body.settings.merge)",
"max_open_per_repo": $(body.settings.max_open_per_repo),
"max_per_day": $(body.settings.max_per_day),
"soak_days": $(body.settings.soak_days)
}
EOT
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.security_fixes
delete_body = local.reset.security_fixes
}
# --- Scanner settings (SAST, dependencies, images, secrets, licences) -------
resource "restful_resource" "scanner_settings" {
for_each = var.scanner_settings
path = "${local.org}/code-security/${each.key}/settings"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = each.value
delete_body = var.reset_on_destroy ? {
for f, v in each.value : f => try(local.defaults.scanner_settings[each.key][f], v)
} : each.value
}
# --- Licence policy overrides per repository ---------------------------------
# A field that is set replaces the org's value for that repository; null
# inherits it. Destroy removes the override (the repository inherits again).
resource "restful_resource" "licence_repo_overrides" {
for_each = var.licence_repo_overrides
path = "${local.org}/repos/${each.key}/code-security/licenses/settings"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "DELETE"
body = each.value
}
# --- Push protection: what a push does when the secret scanner cannot run --
resource "restful_resource" "push_protection_failure_mode" {
count = var.push_protection_failure_mode == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/push-protection/failure-mode"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = { mode = var.push_protection_failure_mode }
delete_body = { mode = var.reset_on_destroy ? local.defaults.push_protection_failure_mode : var.push_protection_failure_mode }
}
# --- Image signature enforcement at pull -----------------------------------
# PUT replaces the whole policy: a field left out of the body is set to its
# default, so the module always sends every field (the defaults merged with
# yours). mode = "enforce" refuses unsigned pulls; roll out in "shadow" first.
resource "restful_resource" "image_signature_policy" {
count = var.image_signature_policy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/image-signature-policy"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = merge(local.defaults.image_signature_policy, var.image_signature_policy)
delete_body = local.reset.image_signature_policy
}
# --- Exception settings: expiry cap, approvers, dismissals need approval ----
# dismissals_require_approval = true: a finding dismissal by someone who is not
# an approver becomes an exception request, and the finding stays open until an
# approver other than the requester approves it.
resource "restful_resource" "exception_settings" {
count = var.exception_settings == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/exceptions/settings"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.exception_settings
delete_body = local.reset.exception_settings
}
# --- Immutable releases and container tags ----------------------------------
# WARNING: releases = true cannot be undone for the releases published while it
# is on. Setting it back to false stops new releases being frozen; it unfreezes
# nothing.
resource "restful_resource" "immutability" {
count = var.immutability == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/code-security/immutability"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.immutability
delete_body = local.reset.immutability
}
# --- Dependency proxy -------------------------------------------------------
# GET returns usage, cap and platform fields as well; only the fields set in
# var.dependency_proxy are sent and compared.
resource "restful_resource" "dependency_proxy" {
count = var.dependency_proxy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/dependency-proxy"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.dependency_proxy
delete_body = local.reset.dependency_proxy
}
# --- Security SLA policy ----------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "sla_policy" {
count = var.sla_policy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/security/sla-policy"
read_path = "${local.org}/security"
read_selector = "sla_policy"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/security/sla-policy"
delete_method = "PUT"
delete_path = "${local.org}/security/sla-policy"
body = var.sla_policy
delete_body = local.reset.sla_policy
}
# ============================================================================
# Collections: ordinary create / read / delete.
# ============================================================================
# --- Allowed email domains --------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "email_domain" {
for_each = var.email_domains
path = "${local.org}/email-domains"
read_path = "${local.org}/email-domains"
read_selector = "patterns.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
delete_path = "${local.org}/email-domains/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "pattern"]
body = { pattern = each.value }
}
# --- SSO domains (registration only; verification is manual) ----------------
resource "restful_resource" "sso_domain" {
for_each = var.sso_domains
path = "${local.org}/sso/domains"
read_path = "${local.org}/sso/domains"
# GET lists every registration under `challenges` (pending, verified or
# expired; the row and its id stay after verification).
read_selector = "challenges.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
delete_path = "${local.org}/sso/domains/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "domain", "status"]
body = { domain = each.value }
}
# --- Webhook destinations ---------------------------------------------------
# The signing secret is returned once at create. output_attrs keeps it out of
# state; read it from the create response in the console instead, or rotate it
# with POST .../rotate.
resource "restful_resource" "webhook" {
for_each = var.webhooks
path = "${local.org}/webhooks/destinations"
read_path = "${local.org}/webhooks/destinations"
read_selector = "destinations.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
update_method = "PATCH"
update_path = "${local.org}/webhooks/destinations/$(body.id)"
delete_path = "${local.org}/webhooks/destinations/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "name", "target_url", "events", "repo_filter_regex", "active"]
body = merge({ name = each.key }, each.value)
force_new_attrs = ["name", "target_url", "events", "repo_filter_regex"]
}
# --- SIEM forwarding endpoints ----------------------------------------------
# Two resources, split on whether the endpoint has an auth header. magodo/restful
# 0.25.2 forgets an ephemeral_body's fingerprint after an in-place update, so a
# resource that sets the attribute at all -- even to null, which a conditional
# types as a null object -- plans an empty PATCH on every run after its first
# update, and the API refuses it (400). Endpoints without a header therefore
# never set ephemeral_body.
locals {
siem_auth_names = nonsensitive(toset(keys(var.siem_auth_headers)))
}
resource "restful_resource" "siem_endpoint" {
for_each = { for k, v in var.siem_endpoints : k => v if !contains(local.siem_auth_names, k) }
path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints"
read_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints"
read_selector = "endpoints.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
update_method = "PATCH"
update_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints/$(body.id)"
delete_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "name", "url", "action_prefixes", "enabled", "signature_mode", "auth_header_name"]
body = merge({ name = each.key }, each.value)
force_new_attrs = ["name", "url", "action_prefixes", "signature_mode", "batch"]
}
resource "restful_resource" "siem_endpoint_with_auth" {
for_each = { for k, v in var.siem_endpoints : k => v if contains(local.siem_auth_names, k) }
path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints"
read_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints"
read_selector = "endpoints.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
update_method = "PATCH"
update_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints/$(body.id)"
delete_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "name", "url", "action_prefixes", "enabled", "signature_mode", "auth_header_name"]
body = merge({ name = each.key }, each.value)
# The auth header value is sent once and never stored in state. After an
# in-place change the next plan shows one more update, which re-sends the
# header; the plan after that is clean (the same provider behaviour).
ephemeral_body = { auth_header = var.siem_auth_headers[each.key] }
force_new_attrs = ["name", "url", "action_prefixes", "signature_mode", "batch"]
}
# --- Deployment environments ------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "environment" {
for_each = var.environments
path = "${local.org}/environments"
read_path = "${local.org}/environments/${each.value}"
delete_path = "${local.org}/environments/${each.value}"
output_attrs = ["name"]
body = { name = each.value }
}
# --- Org-level Actions secrets ----------------------------------------------
# The value is write-only: sent on create, never read back, never in state. A
# changed value is therefore not detected by plan; to rotate, replace the
# resource (`-replace=...`).
resource "restful_resource" "org_secret" {
for_each = nonsensitive(toset(keys(var.org_secrets)))
path = "${local.org}/secrets/${each.key}"
create_method = "PUT"
read_path = "${local.org}/secrets"
read_selector = "secrets.#(name==\"${each.key}\")"
delete_path = "${local.org}/secrets/${each.key}"
output_attrs = ["name"]
body = { name = each.key }
ephemeral_body = { data = var.org_secrets[each.key] }
}
# ============================================================================
# Package access: per-package access and protected names.
# ============================================================================
locals {
package_refs = {
for k, v in var.packages : k => {
type = split("/", k)[0]
name = join("/", slice(split("/", k), 1, length(split("/", k))))
path = "${local.org}/packages/${split("/", k)[0]}/${urlencode(join("/", slice(split("/", k), 1, length(split("/", k)))))}/access"
}
}
package_team_grants = merge([
for k, v in var.packages : { for team, perm in v.teams : "${k}#${team}" => { pkg = k, team = team, permission = perm } }
]...)
package_actions_grants = merge([
for k, v in var.packages : { for repo, perm in v.actions : "${k}#${repo}" => { pkg = k, repo = repo, permission = perm } }
]...)
}
# --- Organisation default ---------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "package_access_default" {
count = var.package_access_default == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/packages/access-settings"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = { default_mode = var.package_access_default }
delete_body = { default_mode = var.reset_on_destroy ? "legacy" : var.package_access_default }
}
# --- One package's settings -------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "package_access" {
for_each = var.packages
path = local.package_refs[each.key].path
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "DELETE"
body = { mode = each.value.mode, inherit_repo = each.value.inherit_repo }
}
# --- Team grants on a package -----------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "package_team_grant" {
for_each = local.package_team_grants
path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/teams/${each.value.team}"
read_path = local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path
# The resource id is the read path (the package); writes and the delete must
# name the grant itself, or they would hit the package's own settings.
update_path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/teams/${each.value.team}"
delete_path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/teams/${each.value.team}"
read_selector = "grants.teams.#(team==\"${each.value.team}\")"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "DELETE"
body = { permission = each.value.permission }
depends_on = [restful_resource.package_access]
}
# --- Actions grants on a package --------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "package_actions_grant" {
for_each = local.package_actions_grants
path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/actions/${each.value.repo}"
read_path = local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path
# The resource id is the read path (the package); writes and the delete must
# name the grant itself, or they would hit the package's own settings.
update_path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/actions/${each.value.repo}"
delete_path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/actions/${each.value.repo}"
read_selector = "grants.actions.#(repository==\"${each.value.repo}\")"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "DELETE"
body = { permission = each.value.permission }
depends_on = [restful_resource.package_access]
}
# --- Protected package names ------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "package_protection_rule" {
for_each = var.package_protection_rules
path = "${local.org}/packages/protection-rules"
read_path = "${local.org}/packages/protection-rules"
read_selector = "rules.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/packages/protection-rules/$(body.id)"
delete_path = "${local.org}/packages/protection-rules/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "type", "name_pattern"]
body = each.value
}Modulets outputs: outputs.tf
output "webhook_ids" {
description = "Webhook destination IDs by name."
value = { for k, r in restful_resource.webhook : k => r.output.id }
}
output "siem_endpoint_ids" {
description = "SIEM endpoint IDs by name."
value = merge({ for k, r in restful_resource.siem_endpoint : k => r.output.id }, { for k, r in restful_resource.siem_endpoint_with_auth : k => r.output.id })
}Modulets fastlåste provider: versions.tf
# fremforge org settings as code: a module for Terraform and OpenTofu.
#
# Every fremforge setting this module manages goes through the fremforge API
# (https://frem.sh/_app/api/v1) with the generic magodo/restful provider. The
# module declares no provider block; the caller configures `restful` (see
# ../../example/providers.tf) and passes it in.
#
# Provider licence: magodo/restful is MPL-2.0. Tested with Terraform 1.16 and
# OpenTofu 1.13 (docs.frem.sh/admin/configuration-as-code/).
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.11.0"
required_providers {
restful = {
source = "magodo/restful"
version = "0.25.2"
}
}
}Sådan kalder du det
Et rodmodul, der konfigurerer én organisation fra ende til anden. Erstat eksemplets URL’er og CIDR’er med dine egne.
# A whole org's fremforge settings in one module call. Every argument is
# optional; drop the ones you do not want to manage.
module "org" {
source = "../modules/fremforge-org"
org = var.org
reset_on_destroy = var.reset_on_destroy
# Authentication and access
auth_policy = {
max_pat_lifetime_days = 30
ssh_disabled = true
allow_user_pats = false
allow_repo_deploy_keys = false
require_signed_commits = false
}
ip_allowlist = {
cidrs = var.office_cidrs
audit_only = true
allow_platform_runners = true
}
operator_access = { allow = true }
email_domain_allowlist_enforced = true
email_domains = ["example.com"]
ssh_ca = {
ca_keys = []
require_cert = false
}
# Repository and Actions defaults
branch_protection_defaults = {
enabled = true
required_approvals = 1
dismiss_stale_reviews = true
require_status_checks = true
require_pull_request = true
require_codeowners_review = false
merge_queue = "default"
}
actions_policy = { only_protected_branches = true }
artifact_retention = { days = 30 }
dependency_updates = {
automerge_patch = true
automerge_minor = false
major_approval = true
}
security_fixes = {
mode = "auto_important"
merge = "review"
}
# Code security
scan_policy = {
dep_scan = { mode = "enforce", block_severity = "critical" }
sast = { mode = "enforce", block_severity = "error" }
}
scanner_settings = {
sast = { enabled = true, block_severity = "error" }
deps = { enabled = true }
images = { enabled = true }
secrets = { enabled = true }
licenses = { enabled = true }
}
push_protection_failure_mode = "block"
exception_settings = {
max_days = 180
approver_team = null
dismissals_require_approval = true
}
immutability = {
releases = false
allow_repo_opt_out = false
oci_mode = "off"
oci_mutable_tags = []
}
image_signature_policy = {
enabled = true
mode = "shadow"
identities = [{
issuer = "https://frem.sh/_app/runner/oidc"
subject_regex = "https://frem\\.sh/${var.org}/[^/]+/\\.forgejo/workflows/release\\.yaml@refs/heads/main"
}]
scope = []
}
sla_policy = {
critical_sla_days = 7
high_sla_days = 30
medium_sla_days = 90
low_sla_days = null
}
# Integrations
webhooks = {
audit-feed = {
target_url = var.webhook_url
events = ["push", "pull_request"]
active = true
}
}
siem_endpoints = {
siem = {
url = var.siem_url
action_prefixes = ["auth.", "security."]
enabled = true
}
}
environments = ["staging", "production"]
org_secrets = var.org_secrets
# SSO domain registration. Verification (DNS or HTTP) stays a manual step.
sso_domains = var.sso_domains
}# Repositories and branch protection through Forgejo's own API. Delete this
# file (and the forgejo provider, see providers.tf) to manage only fremforge
# settings.
#
# fremforge manages part of every default-branch rule itself: a new repository
# gets the org's branch-protection defaults, and every scanner your scan policy
# sets to enforce adds its fremforge/<scanner> status context. List exactly
# those contexts here (docs.frem.sh/security/branch-protection/ has them all):
# leave one out and plan shows it as drift; add one nothing posts and merges
# block waiting for it.
resource "forgejo_repository" "service" {
owner = var.org
name = var.repo_name
private = true
default_branch = "main"
auto_init = true
# fremforge creates repositories with squash as the default merge style. The
# provider's own default is "merge", so without this line every plan after
# the first shows a change.
default_merge_style = "squash"
}
resource "forgejo_branch_protection" "service_main" {
repository_id = forgejo_repository.service.id
branch_name = "main"
required_approvals = 1
enable_status_check = true
# Every scanner enforces by default, so fremforge adds all of these to the
# rule soon after the repository is created (in this order). A shorter list
# shows as drift on a later plan.
status_check_contexts = [
"fremforge/cosign-verify",
"fremforge/dep-scan",
"fremforge/image-scan",
"fremforge/license-scan",
"fremforge/release-age",
"fremforge/sast",
"fremforge/secret-scan",
]
}Eksemplets inputs: variables.tf
variable "org" {
description = "Your fremforge organisation slug, as in frem.sh/<org>."
type = string
}
variable "fremforge_token" {
description = "fremforge API token (ffp_...): an org API token, or a one-hour token from the OIDC token exchange."
type = string
sensitive = true
}
variable "forgejo_token" {
description = "Forgejo access token for the repository part (forgejo.tf). Required while forgejo.tf is in the configuration."
type = string
sensitive = true
}
variable "office_cidrs" {
description = "CIDR ranges for the IP allowlist. Kept in audit-only mode in this example."
type = list(string)
default = ["192.0.2.0/24"]
}
variable "siem_url" {
description = "Where SIEM events are forwarded. Must be a public HTTPS URL."
type = string
default = "https://siem.example.com/fremforge"
}
variable "webhook_url" {
description = "Where org webhooks are delivered. Must be a public HTTPS URL."
type = string
default = "https://hooks.example.com/fremforge"
}
variable "reset_on_destroy" {
description = "true only for a throwaway test org: destroy then restores platform defaults."
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "repo_name" {
description = "Name of the example repository. A deleted repository stays in the org's trash for its restore window, so reuse of a name can fail until it is purged."
type = string
default = "iac-example-service"
}
variable "org_secrets" {
description = "Org-level Actions secrets, { NAME = \"value\" }. Pass them from your secret store (TF_VAR_org_secrets); values are write-only and never stored in state."
type = map(string)
default = {}
sensitive = true
}
variable "sso_domains" {
description = "Domains to register for SSO, e.g. [\"acme.com\"]. Registration only: verify each one in the console."
type = set(string)
default = []
}Alle endpoints, og hvordan de hænger sammen
| Indstilling, modulinput | API (skriv, derefter læs) |
|---|---|
Godkendelsespolitik, auth_policy | PATCH, GET /orgs/{org}/auth-policy |
IP-tilladelsesliste, ip_allowlist | PUT /orgs/{org}/security/ip-policy, GET /orgs/{org}/security |
Operatøradgang, operator_access | PUT /orgs/{org}/security/operator-access, GET /orgs/{org}/security |
Tilladelsesliste for e-maildomæner til/fra, email_domain_allowlist_enforced | PUT /orgs/{org}/email-domains/policy, GET /orgs/{org}/email-domains |
Tilladte e-maildomæner, email_domains | POST, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/email-domains |
SSH-certifikatmyndighed, ssh_ca | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/ssh-ca |
SSO-domæner, sso_domains | POST, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/sso/domains |
Standarder for branch-beskyttelse, branch_protection_defaults | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/policy (branch_protection) |
Scanningspolitik for hele organisationen, scan_policy | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/policy (scan_policy) |
Actions-politik, actions_policy | PUT /orgs/{org}/security/actions-policy, GET /orgs/{org}/security |
Opbevaring af artefakter, artifact_retention | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/artifact-retention |
Afhængighedsopdateringer: versionsopdateringer, dependency_updates | GET/PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/version-updates/settings |
Afhængighedsopdateringer: sikkerhedsrettelser, security_fixes | GET/PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/security-fixes/settings |
Scannerindstillinger, scanner_settings | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/code-security/{scanner}/settings |
Licenspolitik pr. repository, licence_repo_overrides | PUT, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/repos/{repo}/code-security/licenses/settings |
Fejltilstand for push-beskyttelse, push_protection_failure_mode | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/push-protection/failure-mode |
Indstillinger for undtagelser (maksimal udløbstid, godkenderteam, afvisninger kræver godkendelse), exception_settings | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/exceptions/settings |
Uforanderlige releases og tags, immutability | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/code-security/immutability |
SLA-politik for sikkerhed, sla_policy | PUT /orgs/{org}/security/sla-policy, GET /orgs/{org}/security |
Håndhævelse af image-signaturer, image_signature_policy | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/image-signature-policy (erstatter hele politikken; modulet sender alle felter) |
Dependency proxy, dependency_proxy | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/dependency-proxy |
Webhook-destinationer, webhooks | POST, PATCH, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/webhooks/destinations |
SIEM-videresendelse, siem_endpoints | POST, PATCH, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/siem/endpoints |
Deployment-miljøer, environments | POST, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/environments |
Standardadgang til pakker, package_access_default | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/packages/access-settings |
Adgang og tildelinger pr. pakke, packages | PUT, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/packages/{type}/{name}/access, .../access/teams/{team}, .../access/actions/{repo} |
Beskyttede pakkenavne, package_protection_rules | POST, PUT, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/packages/protection-rules |
Organisationens Actions-secrets, org_secrets | PUT, DELETE /orgs/{org}/secrets/{name}, GET /orgs/{org}/secrets |
Repositorier, forgejo_repository | Forgejo /api/v1/orgs/{org}/repos |
Branch-beskyttelse pr. repository, forgejo_branch_protection | Forgejo /api/v1/repos/{org}/{repo}/branch_protections |
Det skal du vide om hver indstilling:
- Godkendelsespolitik: en vilkårlig delmængde af felterne.
max_pat_lifetime_daystagernulleller en af7,30,90,180,365; enhver anden værdi afvises med400. - IP-tilladelsesliste:
PUTerstatter hele listen, så send alle tre felter. Den første skrivning flytter også en organisation, der stadig har et ældre scope (webellerweb+git), over påall, én liste for alle overflader; de ældre scopes kan ikke vælges igen. En håndhævende liste, der ikke indeholder din egen adresse, afvises med400 invalid-allowlist, så CLI’en ikke kan lukke den maskine ude, den kører på. Begynd medaudit_only = true. - Standarder for branch-beskyttelse: omfatter
merge_queue(default,on,off) for de regler, standarderne opretter. - Scanningspolitik for hele organisationen:
image_scan.block_severityer image-blokeringstærsklen for merges og pulls:low,medium,high,criticalellernull(high). Andre værdier afvises med400. - Nogle indstillinger skrives og læses under forskellige navne (operatøradgang, Actions-politik, opbevaring af artefakter, tilladelsesliste for e-maildomæner, afhængighedsopdateringer). Modulet oversætter dem med en læseskabelon, så
plansammenligner lige med lige. - Afhængighedsopdateringer: alle felter undtagen
schedule. - Uforanderlige releases:
releases = trueer envejs for de releases, der udgives, mens den er slået til. - Dependency proxy: slået til som standard for alle organisationer.
malware_scan(standardfalse) slår ClamAV-scanning til af det, proxyen henter;block_until_scannedkræver den, og enPUT, der ville ladeblock_until_scannedvære slået til medmalware_scanslået fra, afvises med400 scan-pair(se Hentninger gennem dependency proxy).metadata_filterskjuler de versioner, din pakkepolitik ville afvise, fra de pakkemetadata, proxyen serverer (npm, PyPI, Maven, NuGet, Go, Helm og Cargo), så pakkehåndteringer vælger den nyeste tilladte version i stedet for at fejle ved downloaden. Er ingen version tilladt, serveres metadataene fuldt ud, og downloaden afvises med begrundelsen."shadow"skjuler intet og viser, hvad den ville skjule, underGET /orgs/{org}/package-policy/decisions(metadata)."on"er indtil videre kun tilgængelig for fremforges interne organisationer; andre steder afvises den med403 metadata-filter-internal-only. - Webhooks og SIEM-endpoints: kun
active(webhooks) ellerenabled(SIEM) ændres på stedet. Enhver anden ændring erstatter destinationen og opretter en ny secret. Modulet administrerer SIEM-endpoints med en godkendelsesheader i en separat ressource,siem_endpoint_with_auth; se Begrænsninger. - SSO-domæner: kun registrering. Modulet registrerer hvert domæne og læser det tilbage fra listen
challenges; DNS- eller HTTP-verificeringen er et manuelt trin i konsollen. - Branch-beskyttelse på repositorier (
forgejo_branch_protection): fremforge tilføjer en statuskontekstfremforge/<scanner>for hver scanner, din scanningspolitik håndhæver, og alle scannere håndhæver som standard. Angiv dem alle, i den rækkefølge eksemplet bruger, ellers viser en senereplanreglen som drift. - Organisationens Actions-secrets: værdien er write-only, så
plankan ikke se en ændret værdi. Rotér med-replace. Send værdierne fra dit secret-lager, for eksempelTF_VAR_org_secrets='{"DEPLOY_KEY":"..."}'. - Write-only-argumenter i OpenTofus plan: når en
restful_resourceændres på stedet, skriver OpenTofu~ ephemeral_body = (write-only attribute)blandt ændringerne. Terraform udelader den linje. Det er ikke drift, og der sendes ikke noget ekstra; tallene iPlan:er de samme under begge CLI’er.
Secrets holdes ude af state. Signeringssecrets til webhooks og HMAC-secrets til SIEM returneres én gang, når de oprettes. Modulets output_attrs fjerner dem fra state; læs dem i konsollen, eller rotér dem gennem API’et. Værdier af Actions-secrets og SIEM-godkendelsesheadere sendes som write-only-argumenter og gemmes aldrig.
Hvad vi tester
Modulet ovenfor kører mod en dedikeret fremforge-testorganisation med begge CLI’er ved hjælp af scriptet nedenfor:
applyeksemplet;plan -detailed-exitcodeigen, som skal afslutte med0(ingen ændringer);- anvend en ændring: kopiér
test/change_override.tfind,planskal afslutte med2,applyudfører ændringen, ogplanderefter skal afslutte med0; destroymedreset_on_destroy = true, hvorefter alle indstillinger læses tilbage, som de var før kørslen.
Testscriptet: run-cycle.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# run-cycle.sh: the whole lifecycle of the example, with either CLI.
#
# run-cycle.sh terraform # or: run-cycle.sh tofu
#
# init -> apply -> plan again (must report no changes) -> apply a change
# (test/change_override.tf: plan must show it, apply makes it, the plan after
# must be clean) -> destroy. The no-change plans are the checks that matter:
# they prove every setting reads back exactly as it was written, which is what
# drift detection depends on.
#
# Expects TF_VAR_org, TF_VAR_fremforge_token and TF_VAR_forgejo_token in the
# environment, and TF_VAR_repo_name set to a name not used before (a destroyed
# repository sits in the org's trash under its old name). Set TF_VAR_org_secrets
# to cover org Actions secrets. Run it against a test org only: it sets
# reset_on_destroy, so destroy puts platform defaults back.
set -euo pipefail
cli="${1:?usage: run-cycle.sh terraform|tofu}"
case "$cli" in
terraform | tofu) ;;
*)
echo "run-cycle.sh: unknown CLI '$cli' (want terraform or tofu)" >&2
exit 2
;;
esac
cd "$(dirname "$0")/example"
export TF_VAR_reset_on_destroy=true
export TF_IN_AUTOMATION=1
# A fresh working directory per run: the two CLIs record providers under
# different registry hostnames, so neither may reuse the other's lock or state.
rm -rf .terraform .terraform.lock.hcl terraform.tfstate terraform.tfstate.backup
rm -f zz_change_override.tf
destroy_on_exit() {
local rc=$?
echo "== $cli destroy"
"$cli" destroy -auto-approve -input=false -no-color || rc=1
rm -f zz_change_override.tf
exit "$rc"
}
# plan_expect <0|2> <label>: plan with -detailed-exitcode and fail unless it
# exits as expected (0 no changes, 2 changes).
plan_expect() {
local want="$1" label="$2" rc
echo "== $cli plan $label (expect exit $want)"
set +e
"$cli" plan -detailed-exitcode -input=false -no-color
rc=$?
set -e
if [ "$rc" = "$want" ]; then
echo "OK: plan $label exited $rc"
return 0
fi
case "$rc" in
0 | 2) echo "FAILED: plan $label exited $rc, expected $want" >&2 ;;
esac
return 1
}
echo "== $cli $("$cli" version | head -1)"
"$cli" init -input=false -no-color
"$cli" validate -no-color
trap destroy_on_exit EXIT
echo "== $cli apply"
"$cli" apply -auto-approve -input=false -no-color
plan_expect 0 "after apply" || exit 1
echo "== $cli apply a change"
cp ../test/change_override.tf zz_change_override.tf
plan_expect 2 "with the change" || exit 1
"$cli" apply -auto-approve -input=false -no-color
plan_expect 0 "after the change" || exit 1Ændringstrinnet: test/change_override.tf
# The "apply a change" step of run-cycle.sh. It is copied into ../example as
# zz_change_override.tf after the first no-drift plan, so the next plan must
# show exactly these changes, an apply must make them, and the plan after that
# must be clean again. Override files replace whole arguments, so each object
# is repeated in full with the changed fields marked.
module "org" {
auth_policy = {
max_pat_lifetime_days = 7 # was 30; must be one the console offers
ssh_disabled = true
allow_user_pats = false
allow_repo_deploy_keys = false
require_signed_commits = false
}
ip_allowlist = {
cidrs = ["192.0.2.0/24", "198.51.100.0/24"] # one added
audit_only = true
allow_platform_runners = true
}
operator_access = { allow = false } # was true
ssh_ca = {
ca_keys = []
require_cert = false
}
branch_protection_defaults = {
enabled = true
required_approvals = 2 # was 1
dismiss_stale_reviews = true
require_status_checks = true
require_pull_request = true
require_codeowners_review = false
merge_queue = "default"
}
actions_policy = { only_protected_branches = false } # was true
artifact_retention = { days = 14 } # was 30
dependency_updates = {
automerge_patch = true
automerge_minor = true # was false
major_approval = true
}
scan_policy = {
dep_scan = { mode = "enforce", block_severity = "high" } # was critical
sast = { mode = "enforce", block_severity = "error" }
}
scanner_settings = {
sast = { enabled = true, block_severity = "warning" } # was error
deps = { enabled = true }
images = { enabled = true }
secrets = { enabled = true }
licenses = { enabled = true }
}
push_protection_failure_mode = "allow" # was block
exception_settings = {
max_days = 90 # was 180
approver_team = null
dismissals_require_approval = false # was true
}
immutability = {
releases = false
allow_repo_opt_out = true # was false
oci_mode = "off"
oci_mutable_tags = []
}
image_signature_policy = {
enabled = true
mode = "shadow"
identities = [{
issuer = "https://frem.sh/_app/runner/oidc"
subject_regex = "https://frem\\.sh/${var.org}/[^/]+/\\.forgejo/workflows/release\\.yaml@refs/heads/main"
}]
scope = ["api"] # was []
}
sla_policy = {
critical_sla_days = 3 # was 7
high_sla_days = 30
medium_sla_days = 90
low_sla_days = null
}
webhooks = {
audit-feed = {
target_url = var.webhook_url
events = ["push", "pull_request"]
active = false # was true: changes in place
}
}
siem_endpoints = {
siem = {
url = var.siem_url
action_prefixes = ["auth.", "security."]
enabled = false # was true: changes in place
}
}
environments = ["staging", "production", "qa"] # one added
}Seneste kørsel, 2026-10-06, HashiCorp Terraform 1.16.5 (den aktuelle udgave, fra releases.hashicorp.com, SHA-256-kontrolleret) og OpenTofu 1.13.1 mod frem.sh (Forgejo v15), med et organisationstoken med policy:write og sso:read/sso:write:
| Indstillinger | Terraform 1.16.5 | OpenTofu 1.13.1 |
|---|---|---|
| Godkendelsespolitik, IP-tilladelsesliste, operatøradgang, tilladelsesliste for e-maildomæner og domæner, SSH CA, standarder for branch-beskyttelse, scanningspolitik, Actions-politik, opbevaring af artefakter, SLA-politik, scannerindstillinger, fejltilstand for push-beskyttelse, uforanderlige releases, afhængighedsopdateringer, webhook-destinationer, SIEM-endpoints, deployment-miljøer, organisationens Actions-secrets, SSO-domæner | apply, plan uden ændringer, ændring (plan afslutter med 2, apply, plan afslutter med 0), destroy: bestået | apply, plan uden ændringer, ændring (plan afslutter med 2, apply, plan afslutter med 0), destroy: bestået |
Repository og branch-beskyttelse (svalabs/forgejo) | apply, plan uden ændringer, destroy: bestået | apply, plan uden ændringer, destroy: bestået |
| Ændring uden om Terraform (en webhook slået fra og en indstilling for afhængighedsopdateringer ændret gennem API’et) | plan afslutter med 2 og viser begge, apply gendanner begge, plan afslutter med 0 | plan afslutter med 2 og viser begge, apply gendanner begge, plan afslutter med 0 |
Alle indstillinger i modulet kørte live: 27 ressourcer anvendt, 15 ændret i ændringstrinnet, 28 nedlagt, under hver CLI. De to CLI’er opførte sig ens i alle trin. De eneste forskelle er providerens signaturkontrol ved init og én linje i plan-outputtet, begge beskrevet ovenfor. Ikke dækket af kørslen: SIEM-endpoints med en godkendelsesheader og verificering af SSO-domæner. Inputtet dependency_proxy blev tilføjet senere (2026-10-10) og kørt for sig selv med OpenTofu mod en testorganisation med dependency proxy slået til: oprettelse, en plan uden ændringer, en ændring fra "shadow" til "on", en plan uden ændringer og destroy, som satte metadata_filter tilbage til "off".
Hvad destroy med reset_on_destroy = true efterlader, sammenlignet med en organisation, der aldrig har sat noget: standarderne for branch-beskyttelse er fremforges grundlinje frem for usat, scanningspolitikken beholder en række pr. scanner, du har administreret, på enforce (det samme som planens standard), SLA-politikken læses tilbage som et objekt af null-værdier frem for null, og scannerindstillinger læses tilbage som configured: true med deres standardværdier. Hver af dem opfører sig ligesom den urørte standard.
Kør det
export TF_VAR_org=acme
export TF_VAR_fremforge_token="ffp_..." # from your secret store, never committed
export TF_VAR_forgejo_token="..." # required while forgejo.tf is in the configuration
terraform init && terraform plan && terraform apply
# or
tofu init && tofu plan && tofu applyTag en eksisterende organisation under administration
Alle organisationer har allerede deres singleton-indstillinger (godkendelsespolitik, IP-tilladelsesliste og så videre). Modulets “create” for en singleton er den samme skrivning som en opdatering, så den første apply skriver dine konfigurerede værdier hen over de aktuelle. Vil du se forskellen først, så importér hver singleton, og kør derefter plan. Med restful-provideren navngiver import-id’et læsestien og de felter, du administrerer:
import {
to = module.org.restful_resource.auth_policy[0]
id = jsonencode({
id = "/orgs/acme/auth-policy"
path = "/orgs/acme/auth-policy"
body = {
max_pat_lifetime_days = null
ssh_disabled = null
allow_user_pats = null
allow_repo_deploy_keys = null
require_signed_commits = null
}
})
}Nøglerne i body skal svare til de felter, du sætter i modulinputtet. Efter importen viser plan kun de felter, hvis aktuelle værdi afviger fra din konfiguration. Gør det samme for de andre singletons, med read_selector tilføjet, hvor tabellen ovenfor læser fra GET /orgs/{org}/security.
For en eksisterende branch-beskyttelsesregel på et repository:
import {
to = forgejo_branch_protection.service_main
id = "acme/payments-service/main"
}Opdagelse af drift
Nogen ændrer en indstilling i konsollen, og den næste plan viser det. -detailed-exitcode gør det til noget, CI kan handle på: afslutningskode 0 betyder ingen ændringer, 2 betyder drift, 1 betyder en fejl. Dette er, hvad vi kørte 2026-10-03 med OpenTofu, med to ændringer foretaget gennem API’et i stedet for redigeringer i konsollen. 2026-10-06 gav begge CLI’er de samme afslutningskoder i den samme test med en webhook og en indstilling for afhængighedsopdateringer:
$ curl -X PUT .../code-security/immutability -d '{"allow_repo_opt_out":false}'
$ curl -X PATCH .../webhooks/destinations/<id> -d '{"active":false}'
$ tofu plan -detailed-exitcode # exit 2
~ resource "restful_resource" "immutability" {
~ body = {
~ allow_repo_opt_out = false -> true
~ resource "restful_resource" "webhook" {
~ body = {
~ active = false -> true
$ tofu apply
Apply complete! Resources: 0 added, 2 changed, 0 destroyed.
$ tofu plan -detailed-exitcode # exit 0
No changes. Your infrastructure matches the configuration.Et planlagt job, der kører plan -detailed-exitcode med et skrivebeskyttet token og alarmerer ved afslutningskode 2, giver dig en driftalarm uden skriveadgang. Enhver ændring foretaget gennem API’et står også i din revisionslog under det token, der foretog den.
Destroy
Singleton-indstillingerne kan ikke slettes, så destroy er også en skrivning. Modulets reset_on_destroy afgør hvilken:
false(standarden):destroyskriver dine nuværende værdier tilbage, så intet ændres, og indstillingen forlader blot state. Brug dette til en organisation, hvor folk arbejder.true:destroyskriver platformens standard for hvert felt, du administrerer, og kalder for standarderne for branch-beskyttelsePOST /orgs/{org}/branch-defaults/reset. Brug dette til en testorganisation.
Samlinger (webhooks, SIEM-endpoints, miljøer, e-maildomæner, SSO-domæner, secrets) slettes. Et slettet repository havner i organisationens papirkurv i dets gendannelsesvindue, og det kan fejle at oprette et med samme navn lige efter en destroy, mens sletningen gøres færdig, så giv et repository, du opretter og nedlægger gentagne gange, et nyt navn.
Vil du holde op med at administrere en indstilling uden at røre den, så brug en removed-blok:
removed {
from = module.org.restful_resource.immutability
lifecycle {
destroy = false
}
}Ikke dækket
Hvad modulet ikke administrerer, og hvorfor:
- Teams og teammedlemskab. Forgejo-provideren har
forgejo_teamogforgejo_team_member, men en ændring af et team kræver et Forgejo-token med organisations-scope, som siden Git-PAT’er ikke tilbyder. Vi har ikke testet dem på fremforge. - SSO-godkendelseskilder (OIDC). De indeholder en klient-secret, og registrering af en kræver et verificeret domæne og en fungerende IdP, så de er ikke i vores testorganisation. API’et (
/orgs/{org}/sso) understøtter registrering og opdatering af tilknytningen fra grupper til teams. - Indbygget SSO-håndhævelse (tilvalget pr. organisation om frisk genautentificering). Der findes intet API til det.
- SCIM, OAuth-klienter, CI-bots, API-tokens. Hver oprettelse returnerer et legitimationsbevis én gang. At gemme dem i state er den forkerte afvejning.
- Medlemmer og brugere. At tilføje en bruger opretter en konto til en person; invitationer sender e-mail. Læs dem med en
restful_resource-datakilde påGET /orgs/{org}/seats. - Tilsidesættelser pr. repository (scanningspolitik, fravalg af uforanderlighed, offentlig dokumentation), tidsbegrænsede undtagelser (tilsidesættelser af push-beskyttelse og malwarescanning, afvisninger af fund), sikkerhedsoversigter og notifikationsindstillinger.
- Miljøvariabler, secrets, gates og branch-regler inde i et miljø. Modulet opretter kun miljøet.
- Feltet
schedulei afhængighedsopdateringer. Det ernullsom standard, og providerens læseskabelon kan ikke gengive ennull. - Alt, der ikke står i OpenAPI-specifikationen. En ukendt sti svarer
501, hvilket også kan betyde en tastefejl.
Begrænsninger ved denne tilgang
- Den generiske provider ved intet om fremforge. Den kan ikke advare om, at
releases = trueer envejs, eller validere en body førapply. Enhver afvisning kommer som API’ets fejl på apply-tidspunktet. API’ets egne kontroller gælder stadig, som kontrollen mod at lukke sig selv ude på IP-tilladelseslisten. - Forgejo-provideren er en tredjepartsprovider til Forgejo i almindelighed. En Forgejo-udgave kan ændre dens opførsel uden varsel fra os. Vi fastlåser versionen og tester den.
- SIEM-endpoints med en godkendelsesheader.
magodo/restful0.25.2 glemmer en ressources write-only-fingeraftryk afephemeral_bodyefter en opdatering på stedet. En ressource, der overhovedet sætter argumentet, planlægger derefter en tomPATCHved hver senere kørsel, som API’et afviser med400. Modulet sætter derfor kunephemeral_bodypåsiem_endpoint_with_auth. For de endpoints viser planen efter en ændring på stedet én opdatering mere, som sender headeren igen; planen derefter er ren. Vi har ikke kørt dette tilfælde live. - State indeholder læsesvar. Modulet holder secrets ude af state som beskrevet ovenfor, men state beskriver stadig din sikkerhedskonfiguration. Brug en backend, du stoler på, og OpenTofus state-kryptering, hvis du kører OpenTofu.
Har du brug for en indstilling, som denne side ikke dækker, så skriv til os på support@frem.sh.
Relateret
- Offentligt REST API: godkendelse, tokens og scopes
- Godkendelsespolitik
- IP-tilladelsesliste
- Uforanderlige releases
- Branch-beskyttelse: den fulde liste over fremforges statuskontekster
- SIEM-videresendelse