Konfigurasjon som kode med Terraform og OpenTofu
Du kan holde fremforge-organisasjonen din i kode med HashiCorp Terraform eller OpenTofu. Begge CLI-ene kjører den samme konfigurasjonen, med to providere med åpen kildekode fra de offentlige registrene:
- Forgejo-objekter (repositoryer, branchbeskyttelse, team, Actions-secrets og -variabler) gjennom Forgejos eget REST API, med
svalabs/forgejo. - fremforge-innstillinger (autentiseringspolicy, IP-tillatelsesliste, standarder for branchbeskyttelse, skannepolicy og skannerinnstillinger, uforanderlige utgivelser, SIEM-videresending, webhooks og mer) gjennom fremforge-API-et, med den generiske REST-provideren
magodo/restful.
For fremforges egne innstillinger finnes det nå en egen provider: fremforge-provideren (source = "frem.sh/fremforge/fremforge", 0.1.1, installert fra frem.sh med bekreftelse av signaturen) dekker dem med typede ressurser, import etter organisasjonens slug og avviksoppdagelse på hvert argument du setter. Foretrekk den for nye konfigurasjoner. Modulen på denne siden forblir dokumentert mens du flytter over; Flytte fra modulen viser hvordan. Repositoryer og branchbeskyttelse blir uansett hos svalabs/forgejo.
Providere
| Provider | Versjon | Lisens | Snakker med |
|---|---|---|---|
svalabs/forgejo | 1.6.1 | MPL-2.0 | Forgejo, https://frem.sh/api/v1 |
magodo/restful | 0.25.2 | MPL-2.0 | fremforge, https://frem.sh/_app/api/v1 |
Providerblokkene er identiske for begge CLI-ene:
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.11.0"
required_providers {
restful = {
source = "magodo/restful"
version = "0.25.2"
}
forgejo = {
source = "svalabs/forgejo"
version = "1.6.1"
}
}
}
provider "restful" {
base_url = "https://frem.sh/_app/api/v1"
# 60 writes a minute per token; retry the 429 instead of failing half-way.
client = {
retry = {
status_codes = [429]
count = 6
wait_in_sec = 10
max_wait_in_sec = 60
}
}
security = {
http = {
token = {
token = var.fremforge_token # ffp_... fremforge API token
}
}
}
}
provider "forgejo" {
host = "https://frem.sh"
api_token = var.forgejo_token # Forgejo access token
}Frekvensgrense. fremforge-API-et tillater 60 skrivinger i minuttet per token og svarer 429 med Retry-After over det. Hele eksemplet er omtrent 27 skrivinger ved apply og 28 ved destroy, så to kjøringer rett etter hverandre går over grensen. Blokken client.retry får provideren til å vente og prøve en 429 på nytt, noe som er trygt fordi 429 betyr at skrivingen ikke ble utført.
>= 1.11.0 trengs for write-only-argumenter, som holder secrets du sender (verdien til en Actions-secret, en autentiseringsheader for SIEM), utenfor state. Både Terraform 1.11 og OpenTofu 1.11 støtter dem.
Hvor binærfilene kommer fra. source = "magodo/restful" peker til registry.terraform.io under Terraform og til registry.opentofu.org under OpenTofu. Begge registrene henter nedlastingen fra prosjektets GitHub-utgivelser. Commit .terraform.lock.hcl: den registrerer sjekksummene til hver provider, så en senere init avviser en binærfil som er endret. Låsefilen registrerer vertsnavnet til registeret, så ha én per CLI og ikke del en arbeidskatalog mellom dem.
Signaturene er forskjellige for de to CLI-ene. Terraform kontrollerer utviklersignaturen til hver provider ved init og skriver Installed magodo/restful v0.25.2 (self-signed, key ID 2A3C3526EE99038E) og Installed svalabs/forgejo v1.6.1 (self-signed, key ID B50B0D17F7964C79). OpenTofu-registeret har ingen signeringsnøkler for disse to providerne, så OpenTofu skriver Signature validation was skipped og stoler bare på sjekksummene. Under OpenTofu er derfor den committede låsefilen den eneste kontrollen av at binærfilen er den du gikk gjennom.
Hvis du ikke vil at CI skal hente fra GitHub ved hver kjøring, speiler du providerne én gang og installerer fra speilet:
terraform providers mirror -platform=linux_amd64 ./providers # or: tofu providers mirror ...# ~/.terraformrc, ~/.tofurc, or the file named by TF_CLI_CONFIG_FILE
provider_installation {
filesystem_mirror {
path = "/path/to/providers"
include = ["*/svalabs/forgejo", "*/magodo/restful"]
}
}Tokener
De to providerne bruker forskjellige tokener, fordi de snakker med forskjellige API-er.
fremforge-API-et (restful). Et ffp_...-token. Opprett et organisasjons-API-token under Organisasjonsadministrasjon → API-tokener (frem.sh/<org>/_admin/api-tokens). Det er bundet til én organisasjon, overlever at personen som opprettet det, slutter, og utløper etter høyst 90 dager. Opprett et token med bare lesetilgang for plan, og hold skrive-scopene for jobben som kjører apply:
| Innstillinger | Lese (plan) | Skrive (apply) |
|---|---|---|
| Autentiseringspolicy, IP-tillatelsesliste, operatørtilgang, e-postdomener, SSH CA, standarder for branchbeskyttelse, skannepolicy, Actions-policy, oppbevaring av artefakter, SLA-policy, policy for image-signaturer, SIEM-endepunkter | policy:read | policy:write |
| Skannerinnstillinger, feilmodus for push-beskyttelse, uforanderlige utgivelser | findings:read | policy:write |
| Webhook-mål | webhooks:read | webhooks:write |
| Utrullingsmiljøer | environments:read | environments:write |
| Actions-secrets for organisasjonen | orgs:read | orgs:write |
| Avhengighetsoppdateringer | renovate:read | renovate:write |
| SSO-domener | sso:read | sso:write |
Fra en jobb i Forgejo Actions kan du unngå å lagre et token ved å bytte jobbens OIDC-token mot et ffp_-token som gjelder i én time (se Bytte av OIDC-token). I dag gir dette byttet et fast sett med scopes (orgs:read, runners:read, findings:read, findings:write, sboms:write): nok til å planlegge innstillingene for skannere, push-beskyttelse og uforanderlighet, men ikke til å endre dem og ikke til å planlegge policy:*-innstillingene. Å endre en sikkerhetsinnstilling krever policy:write, som byttet for runnere aldri gir, så CI-en i et repository kan ikke slå av kontrollene i organisasjonen din. Til apply bruker du et organisasjons-API-token.
Forgejo-API-et (forgejo). Et tilgangstoken for Forgejo, ikke et ffp_-token. Provideren kontrollerer tokenet mot Forgejo når den starter, selv om den ikke har noe å styre, så det kan ikke stå tomt. For å styre bare fremforge-innstillinger sletter du forgejo.tf, providerblokken forgejo, oppføringen i required_providers og variabelen forgejo_token. Hvis autentiseringspolicyen i organisasjonen din ikke tillater brukertokener, oppretter du det under Brukerinnstillinger → Git PATs (frem.sh/user/settings#ff-git-pats), som tilbyr scopes for repositoryer og issues: nok for repositoryer og branchbeskyttelse, men ikke for team.
Modulen
Modulen styrer hver policyinnstilling på organisasjonsnivå som fremforge-API-et eksponerer. Hver innstilling er en valgfri input: utelater du den, rører ikke modulen den. For hver innstilling du setter, eier modulen nøyaktig de feltene du nevner. Felt du utelater, blir verken sendt eller sammenlignet, så en endring av dem i konsollen vises ikke som avvik.
Den ligger i dokumentasjonsrepositoryet under examples/terraform/. Filene nedenfor hentes rett derfra, så denne siden viser alltid koden vi tester.
Modulens input: variables.tf
# Every setting is optional. Leave a variable at null and the module does not
# touch that setting at all. Set it to an object and the module owns exactly the
# fields you name: fields you leave out are neither sent nor compared, so the
# console can still change them without showing up as drift.
#
# Field names are the API's own. The OpenAPI spec is at
# https://docs.frem.sh/api/openapi.yaml.
variable "org" {
description = "The fremforge organisation slug, as in frem.sh/<org>."
type = string
}
variable "reset_on_destroy" {
description = <<-EOT
What `destroy` does to a singleton setting (one that always exists and has
no DELETE). false (the default): destroy writes the current values back, so
the live setting is left exactly as it is and only state forgets it. true:
destroy writes the platform default for every field you manage. Use true for
a throwaway test org, never for an org people work in.
EOT
type = bool
default = false
}
# --- Authentication and access ---------------------------------------------
variable "auth_policy" {
description = "PATCH /orgs/{org}/auth-policy. E.g. { max_pat_lifetime_days = 30, ssh_disabled = true, allow_user_pats = false }."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "ip_allowlist" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/security/ip-policy. Send all three fields: { cidrs = [...], audit_only = true, allow_platform_runners = true }. The PUT replaces the list."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "operator_access" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/security/operator-access. { allow = false } stops fremforge operators managing users in your org."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "email_domain_allowlist_enforced" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/email-domains/policy. true: members may only add email addresses on the domains in email_domains."
type = bool
default = null
}
variable "email_domains" {
description = "POST/DELETE /orgs/{org}/email-domains. Domain patterns members may use, e.g. [\"acme.com\"]."
type = set(string)
default = []
}
variable "ssh_ca" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/ssh-ca. { ca_keys = [...], require_cert = false }. (principal_policy was removed 2026-10-14: ignored by the API and no longer returned, so leave it out or plan shows a permanent diff.)"
type = any
default = null
}
variable "sso_domains" {
description = "POST/DELETE /orgs/{org}/sso/domains. Registers domains for SSO. Verification (DNS or HTTP) is a separate, manual step."
type = set(string)
default = []
}
# --- Repository and Actions defaults ----------------------------------------
variable "branch_protection_defaults" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/policy, body under branch_protection. E.g. { enabled = true, required_approvals = 1, require_status_checks = true }."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "actions_policy" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/security/actions-policy. { only_protected_branches = true } lets Actions run only on protected branches."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "artifact_retention" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/artifact-retention. { days = 30 } (1 to 90)."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "dependency_updates" {
description = "Version updates: PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/version-updates/settings. E.g. { automerge_patch = true, major_approval = true }. Every field except `schedule` and `merge_window`. `security_automerge` is no longer taken here: use security_fixes.merge."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "security_fixes" {
description = "Security fixes: PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/security-fixes/settings. E.g. { mode = \"auto_important\", merge = \"review\" }. Fields: mode, include_unknown, merge, max_open_per_repo, max_per_day, soak_days (`repos` is not managed by this module)."
type = any
default = null
}
# --- Code security ----------------------------------------------------------
variable "scan_policy" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/policy, body under scan_policy. Org-wide mode per scanner, e.g. { sast = { mode = \"enforce\", block_severity = \"high\" } }."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "scanner_settings" {
description = <<-EOT
PUT /orgs/{org}/code-security/<scanner>/settings, keyed by scanner:
sast, deps, images, secrets, licenses. E.g.
{ sast = { enabled = true, block_severity = "error" }, licenses = { enabled = true } }.
licenses also takes the licence policy: allowlisted_license_ids,
denied_license_ids, warned_license_ids, unknown_action, multiple_mode.
EOT
type = any
default = {}
}
variable "licence_repo_overrides" {
description = <<-EOT
PUT /orgs/{org}/repos/<repo>/code-security/licenses/settings, keyed by
repository name: a per-repository licence policy override. Fields:
allowlisted_license_ids, denied_license_ids, warned_license_ids (lists of
SPDX ids), unknown_action (threshold|allow|warn|deny), multiple_mode
(all|any). An omitted field inherits the org's value. E.g.
{ legacy-tool = { denied_license_ids = ["GPL-3.0-only"], unknown_action = "deny" } }.
EOT
type = any
default = {}
}
variable "push_protection_failure_mode" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/push-protection/failure-mode. \"block\" or \"allow\": what a push does when the secret scanner cannot run."
type = string
default = null
}
variable "exception_settings" {
description = <<-EOT
PUT /orgs/{org}/exceptions/settings. Fields: max_days (1..366, the longest
an exception may run), approver_team (a team of the org, or null for the
owners plus the package-policy approver list), dismissals_require_approval
(true: a finding dismissal by a non-approver waits for an approver other
than the requester, and the finding stays open until then; default false).
E.g. { max_days = 90, dismissals_require_approval = true }.
EOT
type = any
default = null
}
variable "immutability" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/code-security/immutability. WARNING: releases = true is one-way for every release published while it is on."
type = any
default = null
}
variable "dependency_proxy" {
description = <<-EOT
PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-proxy. Fields: enabled, block_until_scanned,
retention_days (7..365), metadata_filter ("off" | "shadow" | "on": hide the
versions the package policy would refuse from the package metadata the proxy
serves; "on" is refused with 403 outside fremforge's internal organisations
for now). E.g. { enabled = true, metadata_filter = "shadow" }.
EOT
type = any
default = null
}
variable "image_signature_policy" {
description = <<-EOT
PUT /orgs/{org}/image-signature-policy: which container image signatures
the org trusts at pull. { enabled = true, mode = "shadow",
identities = [{ issuer = "https://frem.sh/_app/runner/oidc",
subject_regex = "https://frem\\.sh/acme/[^/]+/\\.forgejo/workflows/release\\.yaml@refs/tags/v.+" }],
keys = [{ name = "release", public_key_pem = file("cosign.pub") }], scope = ["api"] }.
Fields left out take their defaults.
EOT
type = any
default = null
}
variable "sla_policy" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/security/sla-policy. { critical_sla_days = 7, high_sla_days = 30, medium_sla_days = 90, low_sla_days = null }."
type = any
default = null
}
# --- Integrations -----------------------------------------------------------
variable "webhooks" {
description = <<-EOT
POST/PATCH/DELETE /orgs/{org}/webhooks/destinations, keyed by name:
{ audit = { target_url = "https://hooks.acme.com/fremforge", events = ["push"], repo_filter_regex = null, active = true } }.
Only `active` can change in place; any other change replaces the destination
and mints a new signing secret.
EOT
type = any
default = {}
}
variable "siem_endpoints" {
description = <<-EOT
POST/PATCH/DELETE /orgs/{org}/siem/endpoints, keyed by name:
{ splunk = { url = "https://siem.acme.com/hec", action_prefixes = ["auth."], enabled = true } }.
Only `enabled` can change in place; any other change replaces the endpoint
and mints a new HMAC secret.
EOT
type = any
default = {}
}
variable "siem_auth_headers" {
description = "Optional auth header per SIEM endpoint name, { splunk = { name = \"Authorization\", value = \"Splunk ...\" } }. Sent once, never stored in state."
type = map(object({ name = string, value = string }))
default = {}
sensitive = true
}
variable "environments" {
description = "POST/DELETE /orgs/{org}/environments. Deployment environment names, e.g. [\"staging\", \"production\"]."
type = set(string)
default = []
}
variable "org_secrets" {
description = "PUT/DELETE /orgs/{org}/secrets/{name}. Actions secrets for every repo in the org, { NAME = \"value\" }. Values are write-only: never read back and never in state."
type = map(string)
default = {}
sensitive = true
}
# --- Package access ---------------------------------------------------------
variable "package_access_default" {
description = "PUT /orgs/{org}/packages/access-settings: \"legacy\" (organisation-wide package access, the default) or \"granular\" (every package of a supported type is on per-package access unless it says otherwise)."
type = string
default = null
}
variable "packages" {
description = <<-EOT
Per-package access, keyed by "<type>/<name>" (the first "/" separates the
type; a name may contain more): { "container/team/app" = { mode = "granular",
inherit_repo = true, teams = { release-managers = "admin" }, actions = { api = "write" } } }.
mode: "granular", "legacy" or null (follow the organisation). teams: read,
write or admin per team name. actions: read or write per repository name,
for that repository's Actions jobs. Removing a package from the map
removes its configuration and grants.
EOT
type = map(object({
mode = optional(string)
inherit_repo = optional(bool, true)
teams = optional(map(string), {})
actions = optional(map(string), {})
}))
default = {}
}
variable "package_protection_rules" {
description = <<-EOT
Protected package names, keyed by any label: { releases = { type = "*",
name_pattern = "release/*", push = { owners = false, robots = true,
teams = ["release-managers"], actions = ["api"] }, delete = { owners = true } } }.
Only the listed principals may publish to, or delete, matching packages.
EOT
type = any
default = {}
}Modulens ressurser: main.tf
locals {
org = "/orgs/${var.org}"
# Platform defaults, written back on destroy when reset_on_destroy = true.
# Only the fields the caller manages are reset.
defaults = {
auth_policy = {
require_hardware_backed_keys = false
max_pat_lifetime_days = 90
audit_full_payload_retention_days = 365
require_signed_commits = false
require_oidc_signed_commits = false
allowed_oidc_issuers = []
allow_user_pats = false
allow_repo_deploy_keys = false
allowed_user_pat_scopes = []
ssh_disabled = true
}
ip_allowlist = { cidrs = [], audit_only = false, allow_platform_runners = true }
operator_access = { allow = true }
actions_policy = { only_protected_branches = false }
artifact_retention = { days = 90 }
sla_policy = { critical_sla_days = null, high_sla_days = null, medium_sla_days = null, low_sla_days = null }
ssh_ca = { ca_keys = [], require_cert = false }
dependency_proxy = { enabled = false, block_until_scanned = false, retention_days = 90, metadata_filter = "off" }
immutability = { releases = false, allow_repo_opt_out = false, oci_mode = "off", oci_mutable_tags = [] }
image_signature_policy = { enabled = false, mode = "shadow", issuers = [], identities = [], keys = [], scope = [], trust_public_sigstore = false }
push_protection_failure_mode = "block"
exception_settings = { max_days = 366, approver_team = null, dismissals_require_approval = false }
# GET .../code-security/<scanner>/settings on an org that never saved them.
scanner_settings = {
sast = { enabled = true, block_severity = "error", custom_rules_url = null }
deps = { enabled = true, block_severity = "critical" }
images = { enabled = true, block_action = "warn" }
secrets = { enabled = true }
licenses = {
enabled = true
block_severity = "restricted"
allowlisted_license_ids = []
denied_license_ids = []
warned_license_ids = []
unknown_action = "threshold"
multiple_mode = "all"
}
}
# Version updates (hosted Renovate). Since 2026-10-15 a new settings row
# defaults to 2 / 5 for the PR limits, as the runner always applied.
dependency_updates = {
enabled = true
automerge_patch = true
automerge_minor = false
major_approval = true
pr_hourly_limit = 2
pr_concurrent_limit = 5
}
# Security fixes (Dependency updates, the other lane).
security_fixes = {
mode = "on_click"
include_unknown = false
merge = "review"
max_open_per_repo = 3
max_per_day = 20
soak_days = 3
}
}
# What destroy writes for a singleton: the platform default for each managed
# field, or the managed fields unchanged (a no-op write that leaves the live
# value alone).
reset = {
for k, v in {
auth_policy = var.auth_policy
ip_allowlist = var.ip_allowlist
operator_access = var.operator_access
actions_policy = var.actions_policy
artifact_retention = var.artifact_retention
sla_policy = var.sla_policy
ssh_ca = var.ssh_ca
immutability = var.immutability
dependency_updates = var.dependency_updates
security_fixes = var.security_fixes
# PUT replaces the whole policy, so the reset writes every field.
image_signature_policy = var.image_signature_policy == null ? null : merge(local.defaults.image_signature_policy, var.image_signature_policy)
dependency_proxy = var.dependency_proxy
exception_settings = var.exception_settings
} :
k => v == null ? null : (
var.reset_on_destroy ? { for f in keys(v) : f => local.defaults[k][f] } : v
)
}
}
# ============================================================================
# Singletons: every org has exactly one of each, it always exists, and there is
# no DELETE. "Create" is the same write as "update"; "destroy" is a write too
# (see reset_on_destroy). To bring an existing org under management without a
# write, import first: see docs.frem.sh/admin/configuration-as-code/#bring-an-existing-org-under-management.
# ============================================================================
# --- Authentication policy --------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "auth_policy" {
count = var.auth_policy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/auth-policy"
create_method = "PATCH"
update_method = "PATCH"
delete_method = "PATCH"
merge_patch_disabled = true
body = var.auth_policy
delete_body = local.reset.auth_policy
}
# --- IP allowlist -----------------------------------------------------------
# PUT replaces the whole list; it is read back from GET /orgs/{org}/security.
# An enforcing list that does not contain the caller's own address is refused
# (400 invalid-allowlist), so tofu/terraform cannot lock out the machine it
# runs on. Roll out with audit_only = true first.
resource "restful_resource" "ip_allowlist" {
count = var.ip_allowlist == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/security/ip-policy"
read_path = "${local.org}/security"
read_selector = "ip_allowlist"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/security/ip-policy"
delete_method = "PUT"
delete_path = "${local.org}/security/ip-policy"
body = var.ip_allowlist
delete_body = local.reset.ip_allowlist
}
# --- Operator access --------------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "operator_access" {
count = var.operator_access == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/security/operator-access"
read_path = "${local.org}/security"
read_response_template = "{\"allow\": $(body.allow_operator_user_management)}"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/security/operator-access"
delete_method = "PUT"
delete_path = "${local.org}/security/operator-access"
body = var.operator_access
delete_body = local.reset.operator_access
}
# --- Email-domain allowlist (on/off) ----------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "email_domain_policy" {
count = var.email_domain_allowlist_enforced == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/email-domains/policy"
read_path = "${local.org}/email-domains"
read_response_template = "{\"enabled\": $(body.allowlist_enforced)}"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/email-domains/policy"
delete_method = "PUT"
delete_path = "${local.org}/email-domains/policy"
body = { enabled = var.email_domain_allowlist_enforced }
delete_body = { enabled = var.reset_on_destroy ? true : var.email_domain_allowlist_enforced }
}
# --- SSH certificate authority ----------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "ssh_ca" {
count = var.ssh_ca == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/ssh-ca"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.ssh_ca
delete_body = local.reset.ssh_ca
}
# --- Branch-protection defaults ---------------------------------------------
# Applied to every new repository, and by an hourly sweep to any repository
# with no rule at all. Destroy with reset_on_destroy = true restores the
# fremforge baseline (POST /orgs/{org}/branch-defaults/reset).
resource "restful_resource" "branch_protection_defaults" {
count = var.branch_protection_defaults == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/policy"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = var.reset_on_destroy ? "POST" : "PUT"
delete_path = var.reset_on_destroy ? "${local.org}/branch-defaults/reset" : "${local.org}/policy"
body = { branch_protection = var.branch_protection_defaults }
delete_body = var.reset_on_destroy ? {} : { branch_protection = var.branch_protection_defaults }
}
# --- Org-wide scan policy ---------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "scan_policy" {
count = var.scan_policy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/policy"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = { scan_policy = var.scan_policy }
# There is no DELETE for a scanner's org-wide row. Reset writes the plan
# default (enforce, with the scanner's default severity) for each scanner you
# manage; the row stays, so GET still lists those scanners.
delete_body = { scan_policy = var.reset_on_destroy ? { for k, v in var.scan_policy : k => { mode = "enforce", block_severity = null } } : var.scan_policy }
}
# --- Actions policy ---------------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "actions_policy" {
count = var.actions_policy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/security/actions-policy"
read_path = "${local.org}/security"
read_response_template = "{\"only_protected_branches\": $(body.actions_only_protected_branches)}"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/security/actions-policy"
delete_method = "PUT"
delete_path = "${local.org}/security/actions-policy"
body = var.actions_policy
delete_body = local.reset.actions_policy
}
# --- Actions artifact retention ---------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "artifact_retention" {
count = var.artifact_retention == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/artifact-retention"
read_response_template = "{\"days\": $(body.retention_days)}"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.artifact_retention
delete_body = local.reset.artifact_retention
}
# --- Dependency updates: Version updates -------------------------------------
# GET/PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/version-updates/settings: snake_case
# both ways, the read wrapped in `settings`. `schedule` and `merge_window` are
# not managed here: both are null by default, and the provider's response
# template cannot render a null. (Until 2026-10-15 this wrote
# /dependency-updates/settings, which now answers with Deprecation headers and
# still takes security_automerge; that setting is `merge` under security_fixes.)
resource "restful_resource" "dependency_updates" {
count = var.dependency_updates == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/dependency-updates/version-updates/settings"
read_response_template = <<-EOT
{
"enabled": $(body.settings.enabled),
"automerge_patch": $(body.settings.automerge_patch),
"automerge_minor": $(body.settings.automerge_minor),
"major_approval": $(body.settings.major_approval),
"pr_hourly_limit": $(body.settings.pr_hourly_limit),
"pr_concurrent_limit": $(body.settings.pr_concurrent_limit)
}
EOT
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.dependency_updates
delete_body = local.reset.dependency_updates
}
# --- Dependency updates: Security fixes --------------------------------------
# GET/PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/security-fixes/settings. `repos` is not
# managed here (the response template renders scalars only); set it in the
# console or with the fremforge provider's fremforge_dependency_updates. The lane
# switch (who opens security PRs) is an owner decision and is not managed.
resource "restful_resource" "security_fixes" {
count = var.security_fixes == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/dependency-updates/security-fixes/settings"
read_response_template = <<-EOT
{
"mode": "$(body.settings.mode)",
"include_unknown": $(body.settings.include_unknown),
"merge": "$(body.settings.merge)",
"max_open_per_repo": $(body.settings.max_open_per_repo),
"max_per_day": $(body.settings.max_per_day),
"soak_days": $(body.settings.soak_days)
}
EOT
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.security_fixes
delete_body = local.reset.security_fixes
}
# --- Scanner settings (SAST, dependencies, images, secrets, licences) -------
resource "restful_resource" "scanner_settings" {
for_each = var.scanner_settings
path = "${local.org}/code-security/${each.key}/settings"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = each.value
delete_body = var.reset_on_destroy ? {
for f, v in each.value : f => try(local.defaults.scanner_settings[each.key][f], v)
} : each.value
}
# --- Licence policy overrides per repository ---------------------------------
# A field that is set replaces the org's value for that repository; null
# inherits it. Destroy removes the override (the repository inherits again).
resource "restful_resource" "licence_repo_overrides" {
for_each = var.licence_repo_overrides
path = "${local.org}/repos/${each.key}/code-security/licenses/settings"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "DELETE"
body = each.value
}
# --- Push protection: what a push does when the secret scanner cannot run --
resource "restful_resource" "push_protection_failure_mode" {
count = var.push_protection_failure_mode == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/push-protection/failure-mode"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = { mode = var.push_protection_failure_mode }
delete_body = { mode = var.reset_on_destroy ? local.defaults.push_protection_failure_mode : var.push_protection_failure_mode }
}
# --- Image signature enforcement at pull -----------------------------------
# PUT replaces the whole policy: a field left out of the body is set to its
# default, so the module always sends every field (the defaults merged with
# yours). mode = "enforce" refuses unsigned pulls; roll out in "shadow" first.
resource "restful_resource" "image_signature_policy" {
count = var.image_signature_policy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/image-signature-policy"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = merge(local.defaults.image_signature_policy, var.image_signature_policy)
delete_body = local.reset.image_signature_policy
}
# --- Exception settings: expiry cap, approvers, dismissals need approval ----
# dismissals_require_approval = true: a finding dismissal by someone who is not
# an approver becomes an exception request, and the finding stays open until an
# approver other than the requester approves it.
resource "restful_resource" "exception_settings" {
count = var.exception_settings == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/exceptions/settings"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.exception_settings
delete_body = local.reset.exception_settings
}
# --- Immutable releases and container tags ----------------------------------
# WARNING: releases = true cannot be undone for the releases published while it
# is on. Setting it back to false stops new releases being frozen; it unfreezes
# nothing.
resource "restful_resource" "immutability" {
count = var.immutability == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/code-security/immutability"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.immutability
delete_body = local.reset.immutability
}
# --- Dependency proxy -------------------------------------------------------
# GET returns usage, cap and platform fields as well; only the fields set in
# var.dependency_proxy are sent and compared.
resource "restful_resource" "dependency_proxy" {
count = var.dependency_proxy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/dependency-proxy"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = var.dependency_proxy
delete_body = local.reset.dependency_proxy
}
# --- Security SLA policy ----------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "sla_policy" {
count = var.sla_policy == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/security/sla-policy"
read_path = "${local.org}/security"
read_selector = "sla_policy"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/security/sla-policy"
delete_method = "PUT"
delete_path = "${local.org}/security/sla-policy"
body = var.sla_policy
delete_body = local.reset.sla_policy
}
# ============================================================================
# Collections: ordinary create / read / delete.
# ============================================================================
# --- Allowed email domains --------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "email_domain" {
for_each = var.email_domains
path = "${local.org}/email-domains"
read_path = "${local.org}/email-domains"
read_selector = "patterns.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
delete_path = "${local.org}/email-domains/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "pattern"]
body = { pattern = each.value }
}
# --- SSO domains (registration only; verification is manual) ----------------
resource "restful_resource" "sso_domain" {
for_each = var.sso_domains
path = "${local.org}/sso/domains"
read_path = "${local.org}/sso/domains"
# GET lists every registration under `challenges` (pending, verified or
# expired; the row and its id stay after verification).
read_selector = "challenges.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
delete_path = "${local.org}/sso/domains/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "domain", "status"]
body = { domain = each.value }
}
# --- Webhook destinations ---------------------------------------------------
# The signing secret is returned once at create. output_attrs keeps it out of
# state; read it from the create response in the console instead, or rotate it
# with POST .../rotate.
resource "restful_resource" "webhook" {
for_each = var.webhooks
path = "${local.org}/webhooks/destinations"
read_path = "${local.org}/webhooks/destinations"
read_selector = "destinations.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
update_method = "PATCH"
update_path = "${local.org}/webhooks/destinations/$(body.id)"
delete_path = "${local.org}/webhooks/destinations/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "name", "target_url", "events", "repo_filter_regex", "active"]
body = merge({ name = each.key }, each.value)
force_new_attrs = ["name", "target_url", "events", "repo_filter_regex"]
}
# --- SIEM forwarding endpoints ----------------------------------------------
# Two resources, split on whether the endpoint has an auth header. magodo/restful
# 0.25.2 forgets an ephemeral_body's fingerprint after an in-place update, so a
# resource that sets the attribute at all -- even to null, which a conditional
# types as a null object -- plans an empty PATCH on every run after its first
# update, and the API refuses it (400). Endpoints without a header therefore
# never set ephemeral_body.
locals {
siem_auth_names = nonsensitive(toset(keys(var.siem_auth_headers)))
}
resource "restful_resource" "siem_endpoint" {
for_each = { for k, v in var.siem_endpoints : k => v if !contains(local.siem_auth_names, k) }
path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints"
read_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints"
read_selector = "endpoints.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
update_method = "PATCH"
update_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints/$(body.id)"
delete_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "name", "url", "action_prefixes", "enabled", "signature_mode", "auth_header_name"]
body = merge({ name = each.key }, each.value)
force_new_attrs = ["name", "url", "action_prefixes", "signature_mode", "batch"]
}
resource "restful_resource" "siem_endpoint_with_auth" {
for_each = { for k, v in var.siem_endpoints : k => v if contains(local.siem_auth_names, k) }
path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints"
read_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints"
read_selector = "endpoints.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
update_method = "PATCH"
update_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints/$(body.id)"
delete_path = "${local.org}/siem/endpoints/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "name", "url", "action_prefixes", "enabled", "signature_mode", "auth_header_name"]
body = merge({ name = each.key }, each.value)
# The auth header value is sent once and never stored in state. After an
# in-place change the next plan shows one more update, which re-sends the
# header; the plan after that is clean (the same provider behaviour).
ephemeral_body = { auth_header = var.siem_auth_headers[each.key] }
force_new_attrs = ["name", "url", "action_prefixes", "signature_mode", "batch"]
}
# --- Deployment environments ------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "environment" {
for_each = var.environments
path = "${local.org}/environments"
read_path = "${local.org}/environments/${each.value}"
delete_path = "${local.org}/environments/${each.value}"
output_attrs = ["name"]
body = { name = each.value }
}
# --- Org-level Actions secrets ----------------------------------------------
# The value is write-only: sent on create, never read back, never in state. A
# changed value is therefore not detected by plan; to rotate, replace the
# resource (`-replace=...`).
resource "restful_resource" "org_secret" {
for_each = nonsensitive(toset(keys(var.org_secrets)))
path = "${local.org}/secrets/${each.key}"
create_method = "PUT"
read_path = "${local.org}/secrets"
read_selector = "secrets.#(name==\"${each.key}\")"
delete_path = "${local.org}/secrets/${each.key}"
output_attrs = ["name"]
body = { name = each.key }
ephemeral_body = { data = var.org_secrets[each.key] }
}
# ============================================================================
# Package access: per-package access and protected names.
# ============================================================================
locals {
package_refs = {
for k, v in var.packages : k => {
type = split("/", k)[0]
name = join("/", slice(split("/", k), 1, length(split("/", k))))
path = "${local.org}/packages/${split("/", k)[0]}/${urlencode(join("/", slice(split("/", k), 1, length(split("/", k)))))}/access"
}
}
package_team_grants = merge([
for k, v in var.packages : { for team, perm in v.teams : "${k}#${team}" => { pkg = k, team = team, permission = perm } }
]...)
package_actions_grants = merge([
for k, v in var.packages : { for repo, perm in v.actions : "${k}#${repo}" => { pkg = k, repo = repo, permission = perm } }
]...)
}
# --- Organisation default ---------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "package_access_default" {
count = var.package_access_default == null ? 0 : 1
path = "${local.org}/packages/access-settings"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "PUT"
body = { default_mode = var.package_access_default }
delete_body = { default_mode = var.reset_on_destroy ? "legacy" : var.package_access_default }
}
# --- One package's settings -------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "package_access" {
for_each = var.packages
path = local.package_refs[each.key].path
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "DELETE"
body = { mode = each.value.mode, inherit_repo = each.value.inherit_repo }
}
# --- Team grants on a package -----------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "package_team_grant" {
for_each = local.package_team_grants
path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/teams/${each.value.team}"
read_path = local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path
# The resource id is the read path (the package); writes and the delete must
# name the grant itself, or they would hit the package's own settings.
update_path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/teams/${each.value.team}"
delete_path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/teams/${each.value.team}"
read_selector = "grants.teams.#(team==\"${each.value.team}\")"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "DELETE"
body = { permission = each.value.permission }
depends_on = [restful_resource.package_access]
}
# --- Actions grants on a package --------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "package_actions_grant" {
for_each = local.package_actions_grants
path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/actions/${each.value.repo}"
read_path = local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path
# The resource id is the read path (the package); writes and the delete must
# name the grant itself, or they would hit the package's own settings.
update_path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/actions/${each.value.repo}"
delete_path = "${local.package_refs[each.value.pkg].path}/actions/${each.value.repo}"
read_selector = "grants.actions.#(repository==\"${each.value.repo}\")"
create_method = "PUT"
update_method = "PUT"
delete_method = "DELETE"
body = { permission = each.value.permission }
depends_on = [restful_resource.package_access]
}
# --- Protected package names ------------------------------------------------
resource "restful_resource" "package_protection_rule" {
for_each = var.package_protection_rules
path = "${local.org}/packages/protection-rules"
read_path = "${local.org}/packages/protection-rules"
read_selector = "rules.#(id==\"$(body.id)\")"
update_method = "PUT"
update_path = "${local.org}/packages/protection-rules/$(body.id)"
delete_path = "${local.org}/packages/protection-rules/$(body.id)"
output_attrs = ["id", "type", "name_pattern"]
body = each.value
}Modulens output: outputs.tf
output "webhook_ids" {
description = "Webhook destination IDs by name."
value = { for k, r in restful_resource.webhook : k => r.output.id }
}
output "siem_endpoint_ids" {
description = "SIEM endpoint IDs by name."
value = merge({ for k, r in restful_resource.siem_endpoint : k => r.output.id }, { for k, r in restful_resource.siem_endpoint_with_auth : k => r.output.id })
}Modulens låsing av provider: versions.tf
# fremforge org settings as code: a module for Terraform and OpenTofu.
#
# Every fremforge setting this module manages goes through the fremforge API
# (https://frem.sh/_app/api/v1) with the generic magodo/restful provider. The
# module declares no provider block; the caller configures `restful` (see
# ../../example/providers.tf) and passes it in.
#
# Provider licence: magodo/restful is MPL-2.0. Tested with Terraform 1.16 and
# OpenTofu 1.13 (docs.frem.sh/admin/configuration-as-code/).
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.11.0"
required_providers {
restful = {
source = "magodo/restful"
version = "0.25.2"
}
}
}Slik kaller du den
En rotmodul som konfigurerer én organisasjon fra ende til ende. Bytt ut eksempel-URL-ene og CIDR-ene med dine egne.
# A whole org's fremforge settings in one module call. Every argument is
# optional; drop the ones you do not want to manage.
module "org" {
source = "../modules/fremforge-org"
org = var.org
reset_on_destroy = var.reset_on_destroy
# Authentication and access
auth_policy = {
max_pat_lifetime_days = 30
ssh_disabled = true
allow_user_pats = false
allow_repo_deploy_keys = false
require_signed_commits = false
}
ip_allowlist = {
cidrs = var.office_cidrs
audit_only = true
allow_platform_runners = true
}
operator_access = { allow = true }
email_domain_allowlist_enforced = true
email_domains = ["example.com"]
ssh_ca = {
ca_keys = []
require_cert = false
}
# Repository and Actions defaults
branch_protection_defaults = {
enabled = true
required_approvals = 1
dismiss_stale_reviews = true
require_status_checks = true
require_pull_request = true
require_codeowners_review = false
merge_queue = "default"
}
actions_policy = { only_protected_branches = true }
artifact_retention = { days = 30 }
dependency_updates = {
automerge_patch = true
automerge_minor = false
major_approval = true
}
security_fixes = {
mode = "auto_important"
merge = "review"
}
# Code security
scan_policy = {
dep_scan = { mode = "enforce", block_severity = "critical" }
sast = { mode = "enforce", block_severity = "error" }
}
scanner_settings = {
sast = { enabled = true, block_severity = "error" }
deps = { enabled = true }
images = { enabled = true }
secrets = { enabled = true }
licenses = { enabled = true }
}
push_protection_failure_mode = "block"
exception_settings = {
max_days = 180
approver_team = null
dismissals_require_approval = true
}
immutability = {
releases = false
allow_repo_opt_out = false
oci_mode = "off"
oci_mutable_tags = []
}
image_signature_policy = {
enabled = true
mode = "shadow"
identities = [{
issuer = "https://frem.sh/_app/runner/oidc"
subject_regex = "https://frem\\.sh/${var.org}/[^/]+/\\.forgejo/workflows/release\\.yaml@refs/heads/main"
}]
scope = []
}
sla_policy = {
critical_sla_days = 7
high_sla_days = 30
medium_sla_days = 90
low_sla_days = null
}
# Integrations
webhooks = {
audit-feed = {
target_url = var.webhook_url
events = ["push", "pull_request"]
active = true
}
}
siem_endpoints = {
siem = {
url = var.siem_url
action_prefixes = ["auth.", "security."]
enabled = true
}
}
environments = ["staging", "production"]
org_secrets = var.org_secrets
# SSO domain registration. Verification (DNS or HTTP) stays a manual step.
sso_domains = var.sso_domains
}# Repositories and branch protection through Forgejo's own API. Delete this
# file (and the forgejo provider, see providers.tf) to manage only fremforge
# settings.
#
# fremforge manages part of every default-branch rule itself: a new repository
# gets the org's branch-protection defaults, and every scanner your scan policy
# sets to enforce adds its fremforge/<scanner> status context. List exactly
# those contexts here (docs.frem.sh/security/branch-protection/ has them all):
# leave one out and plan shows it as drift; add one nothing posts and merges
# block waiting for it.
resource "forgejo_repository" "service" {
owner = var.org
name = var.repo_name
private = true
default_branch = "main"
auto_init = true
# fremforge creates repositories with squash as the default merge style. The
# provider's own default is "merge", so without this line every plan after
# the first shows a change.
default_merge_style = "squash"
}
resource "forgejo_branch_protection" "service_main" {
repository_id = forgejo_repository.service.id
branch_name = "main"
required_approvals = 1
enable_status_check = true
# Every scanner enforces by default, so fremforge adds all of these to the
# rule soon after the repository is created (in this order). A shorter list
# shows as drift on a later plan.
status_check_contexts = [
"fremforge/cosign-verify",
"fremforge/dep-scan",
"fremforge/image-scan",
"fremforge/license-scan",
"fremforge/release-age",
"fremforge/sast",
"fremforge/secret-scan",
]
}Eksemplets input: variables.tf
variable "org" {
description = "Your fremforge organisation slug, as in frem.sh/<org>."
type = string
}
variable "fremforge_token" {
description = "fremforge API token (ffp_...): an org API token, or a one-hour token from the OIDC token exchange."
type = string
sensitive = true
}
variable "forgejo_token" {
description = "Forgejo access token for the repository part (forgejo.tf). Required while forgejo.tf is in the configuration."
type = string
sensitive = true
}
variable "office_cidrs" {
description = "CIDR ranges for the IP allowlist. Kept in audit-only mode in this example."
type = list(string)
default = ["192.0.2.0/24"]
}
variable "siem_url" {
description = "Where SIEM events are forwarded. Must be a public HTTPS URL."
type = string
default = "https://siem.example.com/fremforge"
}
variable "webhook_url" {
description = "Where org webhooks are delivered. Must be a public HTTPS URL."
type = string
default = "https://hooks.example.com/fremforge"
}
variable "reset_on_destroy" {
description = "true only for a throwaway test org: destroy then restores platform defaults."
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "repo_name" {
description = "Name of the example repository. A deleted repository stays in the org's trash for its restore window, so reuse of a name can fail until it is purged."
type = string
default = "iac-example-service"
}
variable "org_secrets" {
description = "Org-level Actions secrets, { NAME = \"value\" }. Pass them from your secret store (TF_VAR_org_secrets); values are write-only and never stored in state."
type = map(string)
default = {}
sensitive = true
}
variable "sso_domains" {
description = "Domains to register for SSO, e.g. [\"acme.com\"]. Registration only: verify each one in the console."
type = set(string)
default = []
}Hvert endepunkt, og hvordan det kobles
| Innstilling, modulinput | API (skriving, deretter lesing) |
|---|---|
Autentiseringspolicy, auth_policy | PATCH, GET /orgs/{org}/auth-policy |
IP-tillatelsesliste, ip_allowlist | PUT /orgs/{org}/security/ip-policy, GET /orgs/{org}/security |
Operatørtilgang, operator_access | PUT /orgs/{org}/security/operator-access, GET /orgs/{org}/security |
Tillatelsesliste for e-postdomener av/på, email_domain_allowlist_enforced | PUT /orgs/{org}/email-domains/policy, GET /orgs/{org}/email-domains |
Tillatte e-postdomener, email_domains | POST, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/email-domains |
SSH-sertifikatutsteder, ssh_ca | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/ssh-ca |
SSO-domener, sso_domains | POST, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/sso/domains |
Standarder for branchbeskyttelse, branch_protection_defaults | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/policy (branch_protection) |
Skannepolicy for hele organisasjonen, scan_policy | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/policy (scan_policy) |
Actions-policy, actions_policy | PUT /orgs/{org}/security/actions-policy, GET /orgs/{org}/security |
Oppbevaring av artefakter, artifact_retention | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/artifact-retention |
Avhengighetsoppdateringer: Version updates, dependency_updates | GET/PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/version-updates/settings |
Avhengighetsoppdateringer: Security fixes, security_fixes | GET/PUT /orgs/{org}/dependency-updates/security-fixes/settings |
Skannerinnstillinger, scanner_settings | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/code-security/{scanner}/settings |
Lisenspolicy per repository, licence_repo_overrides | PUT, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/repos/{repo}/code-security/licenses/settings |
Feilmodus for push-beskyttelse, push_protection_failure_mode | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/push-protection/failure-mode |
Innstillinger for unntak (tak for utløpstid, godkjennerteam, avvisninger krever godkjenning), exception_settings | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/exceptions/settings |
Uforanderlige utgivelser og tagger, immutability | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/code-security/immutability |
SLA-policy for sikkerhet, sla_policy | PUT /orgs/{org}/security/sla-policy, GET /orgs/{org}/security |
Håndheving av image-signaturer, image_signature_policy | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/image-signature-policy (erstatter hele policyen; modulen sender hvert felt) |
Avhengighetsproxy, dependency_proxy | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/dependency-proxy |
Webhook-mål, webhooks | POST, PATCH, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/webhooks/destinations |
SIEM-videresending, siem_endpoints | POST, PATCH, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/siem/endpoints |
Utrullingsmiljøer, environments | POST, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/environments |
Standard pakketilgang, package_access_default | PUT, GET /orgs/{org}/packages/access-settings |
Tilgang og tildelinger per pakke, packages | PUT, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/packages/{type}/{name}/access, .../access/teams/{team}, .../access/actions/{repo} |
Beskyttede pakkenavn, package_protection_rules | POST, PUT, GET, DELETE /orgs/{org}/packages/protection-rules |
Actions-secrets for organisasjonen, org_secrets | PUT, DELETE /orgs/{org}/secrets/{name}, GET /orgs/{org}/secrets |
Repositoryer, forgejo_repository | Forgejo /api/v1/orgs/{org}/repos |
Branchbeskyttelse per repository, forgejo_branch_protection | Forgejo /api/v1/repos/{org}/{repo}/branch_protections |
Dette bør du vite om hver innstilling:
- Autentiseringspolicy: et hvilket som helst utvalg av feltene.
max_pat_lifetime_daystarnulleller en av7,30,90,180,365; alle andre verdier avvises med400. - IP-tillatelsesliste:
PUTerstatter hele listen, så send alle tre feltene. Den første skrivingen flytter også en organisasjon som fortsatt har et eldre omfang (webellerweb+git), tilall, én liste for hver flate; de eldre omfangene kan ikke velges igjen. En håndhevende liste som ikke inneholder din egen adresse, avvises med400 invalid-allowlist, så CLI-en kan ikke låse ute maskinen den kjører på. Start medaudit_only = true. - Standarder for branchbeskyttelse: inkluderer
merge_queue(default,on,off) for reglene disse standardene oppretter. - Skannepolicy for hele organisasjonen:
image_scan.block_severityer blokkeringsterskelen for imager ved merge og pull:low,medium,high,criticalellernull(high). Andre verdier avvises med400. - Noen innstillinger skrives og leses under forskjellige navn (operatørtilgang, Actions-policy, oppbevaring av artefakter, tillatelsesliste for e-postdomener, avhengighetsoppdateringer). Modulen kobler dem med en lesemal, så
plansammenligner like med like. - Avhengighetsoppdateringer: alle felt unntatt
schedule. - Uforanderlige utgivelser:
releases = trueer enveis for utgivelsene som publiseres mens den er på. - Avhengighetsproxy: på som standard for hver organisasjon.
malware_scan(standardfalse) slår på ClamAV-skanning av det proxyen henter;block_until_scannedkrever den, og enPUTsom ville lattblock_until_scannedvære på medmalware_scanav, avvises med400 scan-pair(se Henting via avhengighetsproxyen).metadata_filterskjuler versjonene som pakkepolicyen din ville avvist, fra pakkemetadataene proxyen leverer (npm, PyPI, Maven, NuGet, Go, Helm og Cargo), så pakkebehandlere løser opp til den nyeste tillatte versjonen i stedet for å feile ved nedlastingen. Hvis ingen versjon er tillatt, leveres metadataene i sin helhet, og nedlastingen avvises med begrunnelsen."shadow"skjuler ingenting og lister det den ville skjult, underGET /orgs/{org}/package-policy/decisions(metadata)."on"er foreløpig bare tilgjengelig for interne fremforge-organisasjoner; ellers avvises den med403 metadata-filter-internal-only. - Webhooks og SIEM-endepunkter: bare
active(webhooks) ellerenabled(SIEM) endres på stedet. Enhver annen endring erstatter målet og oppretter en ny secret. Modulen styrer SIEM-endepunkter med en autentiseringsheader i en egen ressurs,siem_endpoint_with_auth; se Begrensninger. - SSO-domener: bare registrering. Modulen registrerer hvert domene og leser det tilbake fra listen
challenges; bekreftelsen via DNS eller HTTP er et manuelt steg i konsollen. - Branchbeskyttelse i repositoryer (
forgejo_branch_protection): fremforge legger til en statuskontekstfremforge/<scanner>for hver skanner skannepolicyen din håndhever, og hver skanner håndhever som standard. List alle, i den rekkefølgen eksemplet bruker, ellers viser en senereplanregelen som avvik. - Actions-secrets for organisasjonen: verdien er write-only, så
plankan ikke se en endret verdi. Roter med-replace. Send verdiene fra secret-lageret ditt, for eksempelTF_VAR_org_secrets='{"DEPLOY_KEY":"..."}'. - Write-only-argumenter i OpenTofus plan: når en
restful_resourceendres på stedet, skriver OpenTofu~ ephemeral_body = (write-only attribute)blant endringene. Terraform utelater den linjen. Det er ikke avvik, og ingenting ekstra sendes; tallene iPlan:er de samme under begge CLI-ene.
Secrets holdes utenfor state. Signerings-secrets for webhooks og HMAC-secrets for SIEM returneres én gang når de opprettes. Modulens output_attrs fjerner dem fra state; les dem i konsollen eller roter dem gjennom API-et. Verdier for Actions-secrets og autentiseringsheadere for SIEM sendes som write-only-argumenter og lagres aldri.
Hva vi tester
Modulen over kjøres mot en egen testorganisasjon i fremforge med begge CLI-ene, med skriptet nedenfor:
applyeksemplet;plan -detailed-exitcodeigjen, som må avslutte med0(ingen endringer);- gjør en endring: kopier inn
test/change_override.tf,planmå avslutte med2,applyutfører endringen, ogplanetter det må avslutte med0; destroy, medreset_on_destroy = true, hvoretter hver innstilling leses tilbake slik den var før kjøringen.
Testskriptet: run-cycle.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# run-cycle.sh: the whole lifecycle of the example, with either CLI.
#
# run-cycle.sh terraform # or: run-cycle.sh tofu
#
# init -> apply -> plan again (must report no changes) -> apply a change
# (test/change_override.tf: plan must show it, apply makes it, the plan after
# must be clean) -> destroy. The no-change plans are the checks that matter:
# they prove every setting reads back exactly as it was written, which is what
# drift detection depends on.
#
# Expects TF_VAR_org, TF_VAR_fremforge_token and TF_VAR_forgejo_token in the
# environment, and TF_VAR_repo_name set to a name not used before (a destroyed
# repository sits in the org's trash under its old name). Set TF_VAR_org_secrets
# to cover org Actions secrets. Run it against a test org only: it sets
# reset_on_destroy, so destroy puts platform defaults back.
set -euo pipefail
cli="${1:?usage: run-cycle.sh terraform|tofu}"
case "$cli" in
terraform | tofu) ;;
*)
echo "run-cycle.sh: unknown CLI '$cli' (want terraform or tofu)" >&2
exit 2
;;
esac
cd "$(dirname "$0")/example"
export TF_VAR_reset_on_destroy=true
export TF_IN_AUTOMATION=1
# A fresh working directory per run: the two CLIs record providers under
# different registry hostnames, so neither may reuse the other's lock or state.
rm -rf .terraform .terraform.lock.hcl terraform.tfstate terraform.tfstate.backup
rm -f zz_change_override.tf
destroy_on_exit() {
local rc=$?
echo "== $cli destroy"
"$cli" destroy -auto-approve -input=false -no-color || rc=1
rm -f zz_change_override.tf
exit "$rc"
}
# plan_expect <0|2> <label>: plan with -detailed-exitcode and fail unless it
# exits as expected (0 no changes, 2 changes).
plan_expect() {
local want="$1" label="$2" rc
echo "== $cli plan $label (expect exit $want)"
set +e
"$cli" plan -detailed-exitcode -input=false -no-color
rc=$?
set -e
if [ "$rc" = "$want" ]; then
echo "OK: plan $label exited $rc"
return 0
fi
case "$rc" in
0 | 2) echo "FAILED: plan $label exited $rc, expected $want" >&2 ;;
esac
return 1
}
echo "== $cli $("$cli" version | head -1)"
"$cli" init -input=false -no-color
"$cli" validate -no-color
trap destroy_on_exit EXIT
echo "== $cli apply"
"$cli" apply -auto-approve -input=false -no-color
plan_expect 0 "after apply" || exit 1
echo "== $cli apply a change"
cp ../test/change_override.tf zz_change_override.tf
plan_expect 2 "with the change" || exit 1
"$cli" apply -auto-approve -input=false -no-color
plan_expect 0 "after the change" || exit 1Endringssteget: test/change_override.tf
# The "apply a change" step of run-cycle.sh. It is copied into ../example as
# zz_change_override.tf after the first no-drift plan, so the next plan must
# show exactly these changes, an apply must make them, and the plan after that
# must be clean again. Override files replace whole arguments, so each object
# is repeated in full with the changed fields marked.
module "org" {
auth_policy = {
max_pat_lifetime_days = 7 # was 30; must be one the console offers
ssh_disabled = true
allow_user_pats = false
allow_repo_deploy_keys = false
require_signed_commits = false
}
ip_allowlist = {
cidrs = ["192.0.2.0/24", "198.51.100.0/24"] # one added
audit_only = true
allow_platform_runners = true
}
operator_access = { allow = false } # was true
ssh_ca = {
ca_keys = []
require_cert = false
}
branch_protection_defaults = {
enabled = true
required_approvals = 2 # was 1
dismiss_stale_reviews = true
require_status_checks = true
require_pull_request = true
require_codeowners_review = false
merge_queue = "default"
}
actions_policy = { only_protected_branches = false } # was true
artifact_retention = { days = 14 } # was 30
dependency_updates = {
automerge_patch = true
automerge_minor = true # was false
major_approval = true
}
scan_policy = {
dep_scan = { mode = "enforce", block_severity = "high" } # was critical
sast = { mode = "enforce", block_severity = "error" }
}
scanner_settings = {
sast = { enabled = true, block_severity = "warning" } # was error
deps = { enabled = true }
images = { enabled = true }
secrets = { enabled = true }
licenses = { enabled = true }
}
push_protection_failure_mode = "allow" # was block
exception_settings = {
max_days = 90 # was 180
approver_team = null
dismissals_require_approval = false # was true
}
immutability = {
releases = false
allow_repo_opt_out = true # was false
oci_mode = "off"
oci_mutable_tags = []
}
image_signature_policy = {
enabled = true
mode = "shadow"
identities = [{
issuer = "https://frem.sh/_app/runner/oidc"
subject_regex = "https://frem\\.sh/${var.org}/[^/]+/\\.forgejo/workflows/release\\.yaml@refs/heads/main"
}]
scope = ["api"] # was []
}
sla_policy = {
critical_sla_days = 3 # was 7
high_sla_days = 30
medium_sla_days = 90
low_sla_days = null
}
webhooks = {
audit-feed = {
target_url = var.webhook_url
events = ["push", "pull_request"]
active = false # was true: changes in place
}
}
siem_endpoints = {
siem = {
url = var.siem_url
action_prefixes = ["auth.", "security."]
enabled = false # was true: changes in place
}
}
environments = ["staging", "production", "qa"] # one added
}Siste kjøring, 2026-10-06, HashiCorp Terraform 1.16.5 (gjeldende utgivelse, fra releases.hashicorp.com, SHA-256 kontrollert) og OpenTofu 1.13.1 mot frem.sh (Forgejo v15), med et organisasjonstoken med policy:write og sso:read/sso:write:
| Innstillinger | Terraform 1.16.5 | OpenTofu 1.13.1 |
|---|---|---|
| Autentiseringspolicy, IP-tillatelsesliste, operatørtilgang, tillatelsesliste og domener for e-post, SSH CA, standarder for branchbeskyttelse, skannepolicy, Actions-policy, oppbevaring av artefakter, SLA-policy, skannerinnstillinger, feilmodus for push-beskyttelse, uforanderlige utgivelser, avhengighetsoppdateringer, webhook-mål, SIEM-endepunkter, utrullingsmiljøer, Actions-secrets for organisasjonen, SSO-domener | apply, plan uten endringer, endring (plan avslutter med 2, apply, plan avslutter med 0), destroy: bestått | apply, plan uten endringer, endring (plan avslutter med 2, apply, plan avslutter med 0), destroy: bestått |
Repository og branchbeskyttelse (svalabs/forgejo) | apply, plan uten endringer, destroy: bestått | apply, plan uten endringer, destroy: bestått |
| Endring utenfor Terraform (en webhook slått av og en innstilling for avhengighetsoppdateringer endret gjennom API-et) | plan avslutter med 2 og viser begge, apply gjenoppretter begge, plan avslutter med 0 | plan avslutter med 2 og viser begge, apply gjenoppretter begge, plan avslutter med 0 |
Hver innstilling i modulen ble kjørt live: 27 ressurser brukt, 15 endret i endringssteget, 28 ødelagt, under hver CLI. De to CLI-ene oppførte seg likt i hvert steg. De eneste forskjellene er kontrollen av providersignaturen ved init og én linje i plan-utskriften, begge beskrevet over. Ikke dekket av kjøringen: SIEM-endepunkter med en autentiseringsheader, og bekreftelse av SSO-domener. Inputen dependency_proxy ble lagt til senere (2026-10-10) og kjørt for seg med OpenTofu mot en testorganisasjon med avhengighetsproxyen slått på: opprettelse, en plan uten endringer, en endring fra "shadow" til "on", en plan uten endringer og destroy, som satte metadata_filter tilbake til "off".
Hva destroy med reset_on_destroy = true etterlater, sammenlignet med en organisasjon som aldri har satt noe: standardene for branchbeskyttelse er fremforges grunnlinje i stedet for usatt, skannepolicyen beholder én rad per skanner du styrte, på enforce (det samme som standarden i plan), SLA-policyen leses tilbake som et objekt med null-verdier i stedet for null, og skannerinnstillinger leses tilbake som configured: true med standardverdiene sine. Hver av dem oppfører seg likt med den urørte standarden.
Kjør den
export TF_VAR_org=acme
export TF_VAR_fremforge_token="ffp_..." # from your secret store, never committed
export TF_VAR_forgejo_token="..." # required while forgejo.tf is in the configuration
terraform init && terraform plan && terraform apply
# or
tofu init && tofu plan && tofu applyTa en eksisterende organisasjon under styring
Hver organisasjon har allerede sine enkeltstående innstillinger (autentiseringspolicy, IP-tillatelsesliste og så videre). Modulens «create» for en enkeltstående innstilling er den samme skrivingen som en oppdatering, så den første apply skriver de konfigurerte verdiene dine over de som gjelder nå. For å se forskjellen først importerer du hver enkeltstående innstilling og kjører deretter plan. Med restful-provideren angir import-ID-en lesestien og feltene du styrer:
import {
to = module.org.restful_resource.auth_policy[0]
id = jsonencode({
id = "/orgs/acme/auth-policy"
path = "/orgs/acme/auth-policy"
body = {
max_pat_lifetime_days = null
ssh_disabled = null
allow_user_pats = null
allow_repo_deploy_keys = null
require_signed_commits = null
}
})
}Nøklene i body må stemme med feltene du setter i modulinputen. Etter importen viser plan bare feltene der den gjeldende verdien er forskjellig fra konfigurasjonen din. Gjør det samme for de andre enkeltstående innstillingene, med read_selector lagt til der tabellen over leser fra GET /orgs/{org}/security.
For en regel for branchbeskyttelse i et eksisterende repository:
import {
to = forgejo_branch_protection.service_main
id = "acme/payments-service/main"
}Oppdagelse av avvik
Noen endrer en innstilling i konsollen, og neste plan viser det. -detailed-exitcode gjør det om til noe CI kan handle på: 0 betyr ingen endringer, 2 betyr avvik, 1 betyr feil. Dette er det vi kjørte 2026-10-03 med OpenTofu, med to endringer gjort gjennom API-et i stedet for endringer i konsollen. 2026-10-06 ga begge CLI-ene de samme avslutningskodene i samme test med en webhook og en innstilling for avhengighetsoppdateringer:
$ curl -X PUT .../code-security/immutability -d '{"allow_repo_opt_out":false}'
$ curl -X PATCH .../webhooks/destinations/<id> -d '{"active":false}'
$ tofu plan -detailed-exitcode # exit 2
~ resource "restful_resource" "immutability" {
~ body = {
~ allow_repo_opt_out = false -> true
~ resource "restful_resource" "webhook" {
~ body = {
~ active = false -> true
$ tofu apply
Apply complete! Resources: 0 added, 2 changed, 0 destroyed.
$ tofu plan -detailed-exitcode # exit 0
No changes. Your infrastructure matches the configuration.En planlagt jobb som kjører plan -detailed-exitcode med et token med bare lesetilgang og varsler ved avslutningskode 2, gir deg en avviksalarm uten skrivetilgang. Hver endring gjort gjennom API-et ligger også i revisjonsloggen din under tokenet som gjorde den.
Destroy
De enkeltstående innstillingene kan ikke slettes, så destroy er også en skriving. Modulens reset_on_destroy avgjør hvilken:
false(standard):destroyskriver tilbake de gjeldende verdiene dine, så ingenting endres, og innstillingen forsvinner bare fra state. Bruk dette for en organisasjon folk jobber i.true:destroyskriver plattformens standard for hvert felt du styrer, og for standarder for branchbeskyttelse kaller denPOST /orgs/{org}/branch-defaults/reset. Bruk dette for en testorganisasjon.
Samlinger (webhooks, SIEM-endepunkter, miljøer, e-postdomener, SSO-domener, secrets) slettes. Et slettet repository havner i organisasjonens papirkurv i gjenopprettingsperioden, og å opprette et med samme navn rett etter en destroy kan feile mens slettingen fullføres, så gi et repository du oppretter og ødelegger gjentatte ganger, et nytt navn.
For å slutte å styre en innstilling uten å røre den bruker du en removed-blokk:
removed {
from = module.org.restful_resource.immutability
lifecycle {
destroy = false
}
}Ikke dekket
Hva denne modulen ikke styrer, og hvorfor:
- Team og teammedlemskap. Forgejo-provideren har
forgejo_teamogforgejo_team_member, men en endring av et team krever et Forgejo-token med scope for organisasjonen, og det tilbyr ikke siden Git PATs. Vi har ikke testet dem på fremforge. - SSO-autentiseringskilder (OIDC). De har en klient-secret, og å registrere en krever et bekreftet domene og en fungerende IdP, så de er ikke i testorganisasjonen vår. API-et (
/orgs/{org}/sso) støtter registrering og oppdatering av koblingen mellom grupper og team. - Innebygd SSO-håndheving (tilvalget for ny autentisering per organisasjon). Det finnes ikke noe API for det.
- SCIM, OAuth-klienter, CI-boter, API-tokener. Hver opprettelse returnerer en legitimasjon én gang. Å holde dem i state er feil avveining.
- Medlemmer og brukere. Å legge til en bruker oppretter en konto for en person; invitasjoner sender e-post. Les dem med en
restful_resource-datakilde motGET /orgs/{org}/seats. - Overstyringer per repository (skannepolicy, fravalg av uforanderlighet, offentlig dokumentasjon), tidsavgrensede unntak (overstyringer av push-beskyttelse og skadevareskanning, avvisninger av funn), sikkerhetsoppsummeringer og varselinnstillinger.
- Miljøvariabler, secrets, sperrer og branchregler inne i et miljø. Modulen oppretter bare miljøet.
- Feltet
schedulei avhengighetsoppdateringer. Det ernullsom standard, og providerens lesemal kan ikke gjengi ennull. - Alt som ikke er i OpenAPI-spesifikasjonen. En ukjent sti svarer
501, noe som også kan bety en skrivefeil.
Begrensninger ved denne tilnærmingen
- Den generiske provideren vet ingenting om fremforge. Den kan ikke advare om at
releases = trueer enveis, eller validere en kropp førapply. Hver avvisning kommer som API-ets feil ved apply. API-ets egne kontroller gjelder fortsatt, som kontrollen mot å låse seg ute i IP-tillatelseslisten. - Forgejo-provideren er en tredjepartsprovider for Forgejo generelt. En Forgejo-utgivelse kan endre oppførselen dens uten varsel fra oss. Vi låser versjonen og tester den.
- SIEM-endepunkter med en autentiseringsheader.
magodo/restful0.25.2 glemmer fingeravtrykket av en ressurs’ write-onlyephemeral_bodyetter en oppdatering på stedet. En ressurs som i det hele tatt setter argumentet, planlegger da en tomPATCHved hver senere kjøring, som API-et avviser med400. Modulen setter derforephemeral_bodybare påsiem_endpoint_with_auth. For de endepunktene viser planen etter en endring på stedet én oppdatering til, som sender headeren på nytt; planen etter det er ren. Vi har ikke kjørt dette tilfellet live. - State inneholder svar fra lesinger. Modulen holder secrets utenfor state som beskrevet over, men state beskriver fortsatt sikkerhetskonfigurasjonen din. Bruk en backend du stoler på, og OpenTofus kryptering av state hvis du kjører OpenTofu.
Hvis du trenger en innstilling som denne siden ikke dekker, si fra til oss på support@frem.sh.
Relatert
- Offentlig REST API: autentisering, tokener og scopes
- Autentiseringspolicy
- IP-tillatelsesliste
- Uforanderlige utgivelser
- Branchbeskyttelse: den fullstendige listen over statuskontekster i fremforge
- SIEM-videresending